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Abstract.
In the 1950s and 1960s studies of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder predominantly focused 
on the relation between personality dimensions and dysthymic disorders in general. Using 
criterion measures biased in favour of compulsions, OCD studies typically implicated 
introversion and neuroticism. More recently research has concentrated on descriptive 
features of obsessions identified in "normal" and "clinical" populations. These studies have 
claimed that normals and clinicals differ in degree, not in kind, in their experience of 
obsessions: the two groups have similarities in the form and content of obsessions but 
differences in the degree of controllability and discomfort experienced. Similarly studies 
of compulsions have found washing and checking factors in both groups with group 
differences in the severity of discomfort experienced. The present study reinvestigates the 
contribution of individual difference measures of personality to obsessions and 
compulsions through a normal and a small clinical sample. However this investigation 
uses the recently developed Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988) because it is the only self- 
report measure of both obsessions and compulsions which is also suitable for normal and 
clinical samples. In addition the Padua Inventory incorporates the major findings of 
recent decades as it measures degree of disturbance caused by obsessions and 
compulsions. Further the present study investigates not only the three Eysenckian 
dimensions but also "responsibility" which Salkovskis (1985, 1989a, 1989b) regarded as a 
key cognitive appraisal variable in obsessions and compulsions. Accordingly this study 
provides a basis for the future identification of additional traits which further improve the 
power of the predictive equation for obsessive-compulsive behaviour. Such refinements of 
the most likely personality features associated with OCD form an essential basis for the 
development of effective treatment interventions.
The main study investigated a large normal sample. After controlling for the effects of 
age, sex, and depression, neuroticism was the only important Eysenckian personality 
dimension using the Padua Inventory as the criterion measure; extraversion and 
psychoticism were not important. However Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989a, 1989b) variable 
"responsibility", arguably a trait of psychoticism, added a further 11% to the 10% of 
variance explained by the Eysenckian variables.
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A pilot study investigated the small clinical sample of 20. The same pattern of 
correlations persisted in this sample. Thus some support was also gained for the 
assumption in most current research in the area that obsessive-compulsive behaviour can 
legitimately be studied using normal samples which are readily available and numerous.
Finally, the implications of the findings that particular personality dimensions and traits 
may predispose to OCD, and that additional traits may further improve on the predictive 
power of the Eysenckian dimensions, are discussed. Furthermore the implications of the 
present findings for the use of normals to study clinical obsessive-compulsive behaviour, 
for the future use of the Padua Inventory as a measure of obsessions and compulsions, 
and for cognitive-behavioural treatments of OCD are also discussed.
Table of Contents.
Page
Declaration .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. i
Acknowledgements .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ii
Abstract .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. iii-iv
Table of Contents .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. v
List of Tables .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. vi
Introduction .. 1-28
Historical Perspective on OCD .. .. .. .. .. .. 1-2
Incidence of OCD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2-3
Characteristics of Obsessions and Com pulsions.. .. .. .. 3-7
Derived from Recent Factor Studies of Normal 
and Clinical Populations
Predisposing and Covarying Factors in .. .. .. .. .. 7-15
Obsessions and Compulsions
Theoretical Explanations of OCD .. .. .. .. .. 15-26
Rationale for the Present Study .. .. .. .. .. .. 26-28
Hypotheses .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 28
Method .................................................................................................. 29-43
Development of the Responsibility Scale .. .. .. .. 32-38
Results .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 44-57
Discussion .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 58-71
References .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 72-80
Appendices
vi
Table 1:
L ist o f  T ab les.
Page
Cronbach’s Alpha for the Responsibility Scale with .. .. 34
each Item Deleted.
Table 2: Communalities, Eigenvalues and Variance Accounted for .. 36
by the Rotated (Varimax) Factors.
Table 3: Factor Correlation Matrix for the Responsibility Scale. .. 36
Table 4: Pattern Matrix for the Items after Oblique Rotation .. .. 37
Table 5: Mean Severity of Self-Reported Disturbance due to .. .. 45
Obsessive Thoughts and Compulsive Behaviours.
Table 6: Mean Subscale Scores on the Padua Inventory. .. .. 46
Table 7: Means and Standard Deviations of Predictor Variables. .. 47
Table 8: Correlation Matrix of the Criterion and Predictor .. .. 48
Variables.
Table 9: Intercorrelations among Predictor Variables. .. .. 50
Table 10: Hierarchical Multiple Regression of "Degree of .. .. 51
Disturbance due to Obsessions and Compulsions" 
on Age, Sex, Depression; Neuroticism and Extraversion.
(Hypothesis 2).
Table 11: Hierarchical Multiple Regression of "Degree of .. .. 52
Disturbance due to Obsessions and Compulsions" 
on Age, Sex, Depression; Neuroticism, Extraversion, 
and Psychoticism. (Hypothesis 3).
Table 12: Hierarchical Multiple Regression of "Degree of .. .. 54
Disturbance due to Obsessions and Compulsions" 
on Age, Sex, Depression; Neuroticism, Extraversion,
Psychoticism, and Responsibility. (Hypothesis 4).
Table 13: Means and Standard Deviations of Predictor Variables. .. 55
Table 14: Correlation Matrix of the Criterion and Predictor .. .. 56
Variables.
Table 15: Intercorrelations among Predictor Variables. .. 57
1At some time most people experience intrusive, uninvited, and repetitive 
thoughts and perform unnecessary, repetitive behaviours. Typical examples might include 
uninvited sexual thoughts or senseless repeated checks to ensure an appliance is switched 
off. However for a small two percent of persons such thoughts become obsessive; that is, 
particularly frequent and uncontrollable (Parkinson & Rachman, 1981) and are 
accompanied by compulsive behaviours compelling time-consuming rituals which the 
sufferer "wants not to want" (Rapoport, 1990, p.198). Why is it that this small group has 
such a different experience to most? The main aim of the present research is to address 
this question by exploring particular individual differences, namely personality 
differences, and their relation to the severity of obsessive thoughts and compulsive 
behaviours.
Since 1978, when first proposed by Rachman and de Silva, the assumption 
of a "normal" analogue to "clinical" obsessions and compulsions has guided most of the 
psychological research in this area. Despite this, surprisingly little of the recent research 
has focused on the ability of normal personality theories of individual difference to 
explain or predict individual differences in the experience of obsessive thoughts and 
compulsive behaviours. An identification of the dimensional mix more likely to 
predispose individuals to this crippling psychological disorder would be of considerable 
clinical and theoretical importance, particularly in the refinement of recent cognitive 
behavioural treatment methods.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON OCD.
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder is not in any sense a new problem. In fact 
a syndrome identical to what we now call OCD has been recognized for nearly 300 years 
(Hunter & McAlpine, 1963). However both comprehensive theoretical explanations and 
successful treatments are comparatively recent.
Early descriptions focused on different aspects of this syndrome. English 
explanations stressed religious thought content and a relationship to melancholy 
(Johnson, 1759; Maudsley, 1895; Taylor, 1660). French phenomenologists emphasized the 
importance of anxiety, doubt (the inability to trust a perception) and loss of will 
(Esquirol, 1837; Janet, 1902).
In contrast the German view focused on the irrational nature of the 
thoughts. Westphal (1878), a German psychiatrist and neurologist, considered the central 
feature was not the anxiety or depressive elements, but the cognitive aspect. He
2considered the basic pathology was the emergence of irrational thoughts and used the 
term "abortive insanity" to distinguish these thoughts, which were recognized as senseless, 
from more psychotic thoughts or true insanity. Current notions of Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder include all these aspects and continue to be more descriptive than theoretical 
(Insel, 1990).
Recently the central descriptive features of OCD were clearly delineated 
by Crino (1990):
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is characterized by persistent 
recurrent distressing thoughts, images, or ideas that invade conscious 
awareness against the individual’s will. These are often of violence, 
contamination, harm to self or others, blasphemy, or sexual outrage. In the 
majority of cases they are accompanied by ego dystonic ritualistic 
behaviour that the individual feels compelled to perform (p.234).
Thus the thoughts are experienced as repetitive, distressing, not 
consciously evoked, and of circumscribed content; they are frequently accompanied by 
behaviour that is unnecessary but compelling.
Other recent OCD descriptions, including that of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual-111 Revised Version (1987), specify additional reactions to the 
obsessive thoughts and rituals. These reactions include an appraisal, at least initially, that 
the thought or behaviour is senseless; as well as initial attempts to resist, suppress, or 
otherwise neutralize the unwanted thought or behaviour. However such descriptive 
additions form part of a number of different theories that attempt to explain how OCD 
develops and persists. Some of these theoretical accounts of OCD will be analysed later.
INCIDENCE OF OCD.
Early estimates of the incidence of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder in the 
general population were as low as 0.05%. More recent estimates however suggest a figure 
of 2%, but this is still comparatively low. Flament et al. (1988) estimated the point 
prevalence of OCD in the general adult American population to be between 1% and 2%, 
or between one and two million persons. Similarly Karno, Golding, Sorenson, and 
Burnam (1988) found that 1.3% of Americans experienced clinically significant symptoms 
in the month prior to interview. They also found that OCD was twice as common as 
schizophrenia or panic disorder in the general population.
However unwanted intrusive thoughts or obsessions are also frequently 
associated with a range of other psychological conditions. These include depression
3(Rachman & Hodgson, 1980), sleep disorders (Borkovek, 1979), schizophrenia, and 
anorexia nervosa (Salkovskis & Kirk, 1989). Also OCD occurs with several types of 
neurological disorders: Sydenham’s chorea, epilepsy, postencephalitic Parkinson’s 
disease, motor tics, and toxic lesions of the basal ganglia (Rapoport, 1989). Further, 
obsessive-compulsives are usually embarrassed and secretive about their problem; under­
reporting is a common feature (Beech & Vaughan, 1978).
Thus the prevalence of OCD may greatly exceed 2% of the population, 
given its frequent co-existence with other conditions and the likelihood of under­
reporting.
CHARACTERISTICS OF OBSESSIONS AND COMPULSIONS, DERIVED FROM 
RECENT FACTOR STUDIES OF NORMAL AND CLINICAL POPULATIONS.
There has been an immense resurgence of interest in isolating the 
identifying descriptive features of OCD. This is not surprising given the now commonly 
accepted view that obsessions and compulsions are universal; they can be studied in 
normal as well as in clinical populations. Thus subjects are now more accessible as well as 
more numerous. In fact over the past thirty years descriptive factor studies, rather than 
prospective predictive studies, have dominated the psychological literature. This recent 
return to an early phase in the theoretical development of obsessions and compulsions 
has prompted the development of new measures and new attempts at theory construction 
by, for example, Rachman and Hodgson (1980), Salkovskis (1985), and Insel (1990). 
However the emphasis has been predominantly at the descriptive and measurement level 
rather than at the level of theory.
Normal and Clinical Obsessions.
Thus, as already noted, the first researchers to study normal obsessional 
phenomena as the basis for a better understanding of clinical OCD were Rachman and 
de Silva (1978). They developed a questionnaire (untitled) for use by normal as well as 
clinical populations which "inquired about the presence or otherwise of intrusive 
unacceptable thoughts and impulses, their frequency, and about whether or not these 
could be easily dismissed" (p.233). From their research they concluded that there was a 
normal analogue of clinical obsessional phenomena. This was based on two major 
findings: a 79.84% incidence of intrusive cognitions in a normal population, and 
similarities and differences between normal and clinical obsessions. The similarities were
4in content, form, and in expressed relation to mood. Content analysis identified that 
"clinical obsessions are not as readily discernible ... even to experienced clinicians ... as 
might be expected" (p.239), that thoughts are more common than impulses, and 
depression and anxiety are often associated with thoughts and impulses. However the two 
groups differed in that "abnormal, clinical obsessions lasted longer, were more 
discomforting, more frequent, and more intense. They had lower acceptability, were more 
alien, provoked more urges to neutralize and were more likely to be of known onset. They 
were more often and more strongly resisted, and harder to dismiss.... They were similar in 
form and content, but not in frequency, subjectively felt intensity, nor in their 
consequences" (p.244). Hence quantitative not qualitative differences were identified. 
However it is of note that these conclusions were based on a sample of 124 normals and 
only eight obsessives.
Normal Obsessions.
In another study Parkinson and Rachman (1981) had 60 non-psychiatric 
volunteers rate their intrusive cognitions along twelve dimensions using ten-point rating 
scales. (The rationale for choosing these particular characteristics was not given, nor was 
the questionnaire titled). Performing a factor analysis on these data, they extracted five 
factors which described the structure of unwanted intrusive thoughts. The first dimension 
was General Unpleasantness which had high loadings on discomfort, tormenting qualities, 
stressfulness, unpleasantness, anxiety, and resistance. The second factor was 
Controllability, the third Number of Intrusions, the fourth Frequency, and the fifth 
Unacceptability. Moreover they found their normals reported "lower levels of distress, 
unpleasantness, and acceptability than those of psychiatric clients complaining of 
obsessions" (p.107). Like Rachman and de Silva (1978) they found similar form and 
content for all obsessions: "The content of the most commonly reported intrusive 
thoughts was the subject of death, with the second most common theme to do with harm 
coming to people, especially one’s family and friends" (p.103).
Subsequently Salkovskis and Harrison (1984) administered Rachman and 
de Silva’s (1978) questionnaire (with slight alterations) to 178 polytechnic and psychiatric 
nursing students. The data from the two normal populations were then pooled as there 
were no differences on any variables apart from sex. They found that controllability or 
ease of dismissal was a crucial variable with regard to intrusions, with the strongest 
correlations found being associated with it, for example, discomfort, frequency, type of 
intrusion. Like Rachman and de Silva (1978) they reported a high incidence of obsessions 
88.2% among their normals, low frequency (66% had less than 10 intrusions per week),
5and easy dismissal (control). Thus most had obsessions, but their occurrence was 
infrequent and they were easily dismissed.
In 1985, Clark and de Silva developed the Distressing Thoughts 
Questionnaire (DTQ) to investigate the structure of anxious and depressive thoughts in a 
sample of 303 college students. Six anxious and six depressive thought statements were 
rated on scales assessing such cognitive characteristics as frequency, sadness, worry, 
dismissal, and disapproval. Controllability and emotional intensity (which the authors 
defined as degree of self-reported sadness and worry) were the most salient features 
defining both types of cognitions. In 1988 Legg England and Dickerson reported that in 
115 students uncontrollability was related to the arousing properties of thoughts and to 
attentional involvement with them, but was weakly related to the unpleasantness of their 
content. One possible prediction from this research is that content is important to the 
extent that it contributes to the arousing properties of the thought (or the experience of 
them).
Thus since Rachman and De Silva’s (1978) study there has been 
considerable interest in examining the structure of obsessional thoughts in normal and 
clinical samples using the statistical procedure of factor analysis. In these studies normal 
populations reported obsessions which were similar in form and content to those of 
clinical populations. However the clinical populations were less able to control and more 
distressed by these obsessions than the normals, and their experience of the obsessions 
was quantitatively different. In the majority of these studies, self-reported controllability 
and distress seem to be the central descriptive features that discriminate between normal 
and clinical obsessions.
Normal and Clinical Compulsive Behaviours.
Also several studies have measured compulsive behaviours (rituals) in 
normal and clinical populations. These have predominantly employed the Maudsley 
Obsessional-Compulsive Inventory (MOCI) (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977), and the 
Compulsive Activity Checklist (CAC) (Freund, Steketee & Foa, 1987). The MOCI 
purports to measure the severity of obsessive-compulsive behaviours (Sternberger & 
Burns, 1990) while the CAC the degree to which compulsive behaviours interfere with 
daily activities. Research indicates that both measures have good psychometric properties 
with clinical and nonclinical samples (Foa, Steketee, Grayson, Turner & Latimer, 1984; 
Sanavio & Vidotto, 1985).
6Studies on the CAC and MOCI have identified that contamination 
(Washing) and Checking factors were the only factors interpretable. Moreover they were 
common to the compulsive behaviours of normal and clinical populations, with the two 
groups reporting differences in severity of compulsions (Cottraux, Bouvard, Defayolle & 
Messy, 1988). Nonetheless, though the MOCL and the CAC are the two measures most 
frequently reported in the OCD literature, they do not measure the obsessive 
components of obsessive-compulsive behaviour (Sternberger & Burns, 1990). This poses a 
serious limitation on their usefulness.
In contrast to these two measures, the principal components analysis of 
the Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988) revealed two obsessive as well as two compulsive 
factors. According to Sternberger and Burns (1990) "The Padua Inventory appears to 
hold promise as an instrument which will allow an expanded study of obsessions and 
compulsions in clinical and nonclinical samples, particularly since it is the only self-report 
measure which includes obsessional dimensions as distinct from compulsive dimensions" 
(p.341).
Measures of Obsessions and Compulsions.
Few recent studies have reported the development of new measures of 
both obsessions and compulsions for normal and clinical populations. Two such scales are 
the clinician-rated Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Goodman et al., 1989) and 
the self-report Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988). The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive 
Scale (Goodman et al., 1989) is the most recently developed clinician-rated scale for 
measurement of obsessive-compulsive behaviour. It was designed specifically to provide a 
measure of the severity of symptoms of OCD (as defined by DSM -lll-R, 1987) that was 
not influenced by the type, number, or content of the symptoms. This ten-item scale 
measures five symptoms: time spent in, interference from, distress caused by, resistance 
to, and control over obsessions and compulsions. Each item is rated from 0 (no 
symptoms) to 4 (extreme symptoms). The content validity is established by its strong 
reflection of DSM-111(R) diagnostic criteria.
The most recently developed self-report scale of obsessions and 
compulsions for normal and clinical samples is that of Sanavio (1988). Sternberger and 
Burns (1990) and Crino (R. D. Crino, personal communication, April 25, 1991) have 
recently used the Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988) with normal populations. Hafner and 
Miller (1990) reported using the P.I. in a study of 81 clinical OCDs in South Australia. 
Unfortunately however the allocation of subjects to the clinical OCD group was only
7made on the basis of self-report questionnaire data prompting the authors to 
acknowledge their results needed to be treated with caution.
The Padua Inventory is a factorially derived self-report measure which 
requires the subject to read a list of 60 thoughts and behaviours and rate the degree of 
disturbance or difficulty these cause the individual. Accordingly the Padua Inventory 
incorporates the central findings of recent studies on normal and clinical OCD samples 
that distress and controllability are key discriminators between these populations.
The only reported replication of the Padua Inventory factors for a normal 
sample has been by Sternberger and Burns (1990). They administered the 60 PI items to 
678 American college students and derived a factor structure of obsessions and 
compulsions which was very similar to the one extracted by Sanavio (1988) for his Italian 
sample. It comprised two obsessive as well as two compulsive factors respectively:
(i) Impaired Control over Mental Activities;
(ii) Urges and Worries of Losing Control over Motor Behaviours;
(iii) Contamination Behaviours; and
(iv) Checking Behaviours.
Hence, as in the studies of obsessions and the studies of compulsions, the 
above factor studies found similar form and content for normal and clinical obsessions 
and compulsive behaviours, with degree of disturbance or distress evoked as the essential 
discriminator between the two groups. Accordingly these studies suggest the possibility 
that OCD is not a discrete disease that one either has or does not have. Rather obsessive 
thoughts and behaviours seem to be common, but the experience of them varies for 
different individuals. Just why this is the case is the major question addressed in this 
study. In order to explore it one tool employed has been the P.I. It was chosen to be the 
dependent variable measure because it has sound psychometric properties, the ability to 
measure obsessive and compulsive behaviours in normal and clinical populations, and 
because few replication studies have been reported in Australia.
PREDISPOSING AND COVARYING FACTORS IN OBSESSIONS AND 
COMPULSIONS.
In the OCD literature a range of characteristics have been discussed as 
potential causative factors. These include demographic and socio-cultural variables, 
personality variables, genetic and biological factors, and cognitive-behavioural factors. 
Despite these claims these studies mainly establish co-variance, or suggest
8predispositional status. Nonetheless they provide an important basis on which to develop 
causative theoretical explanations.
Demographic and Sociocultural Variables.
Demographic and sociocultural variables which have sometimes been 
considered important in relation to obsessive-compulsive behaviour include: sex, age, 
'social class, intelligence, and culture.
Sex
Sex has typically been regarded as insignificant in the incidence and 
experience of OCD. In fact, the majority of epidemiological studies report no sex 
differences in the incidence of OCD. The exception to this is the higher incidence of 
washing and cleaning rituals in women (Marks, 1987). This even frequency distribution 
amongst the sexes is atypical for the D SM -lll(R) defined anxiety disorders. Apart from 
social phobia and obsessive-compulsive disorder, most of the anxiety disorders are more 
frequent in women than in men (Cameron & Hill, 1989). However Sanavio (1988) has 
recently found that females are more likely to report increased severity of obsessive- 
compulsive behaviour when measured by the Padua Inventory.
Age
Like sex, age has typically been regarded as insignificant in OCD 
incidence and severity. OCD usually starts in adolescence and young adult life, as do most 
anxiety disorders and minor depression (Marks, 1987). However studies rarely 
differentiate between adult age groups in reporting severity of obsessive-compulsive 
behaviour. A recent exception to this was Sanavio’s (1988) study of 967 normal Italians. 
He found a higher incidence of obsessional behaviour in his 16-20 year old and 46-70 age 
groups for males and females than for the middle 21-45 age group. This suggests younger 
and older normal Italian adults experience more severe obsessions and compulsions than 
the middle-aged adult group.
Thus in general, age and sex appear to be insignificant factors in the 
reported incidence of OCD. However they do seem to be important in the self-report of 
severity of obsessions and compulsions as measured by the Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 
1988). Perhaps this discrepancy is in part due to cultural differences but also because 
other studies did not use samples of the extensive size and age range employed by 
Sanavio (1988).
9Social Class, Intelligence, and Culture.
Many studies of OCD suggest it is not confined to one social class or 
intellectual group. Nonetheless several do suggest the majority of OCD sufferers are of 
above-average social class and intelligence (Black, 1974; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). 
Further OCD is not confined to Western countries, but occurs widely in China, India, and 
Egypt as well (Marks, 1987).
Accordingly there are, in fact, mixed findings with respect to the 
importance of age, sex, social class, intelligence, and culture in OCD incidence and 
severity. This is in part a reflection of the differing criterion measures used across studies. 
Nonetheless the variables sex, age, social class, intelligence, and culture are typically 
regarded as insignificant.
Personality Variables.
Personality variables considered important in obsessive-compulsive 
behaviour include Obsessive Compulsive Personality and depression. The personality 
variables of interest in the present research are discussed on pages 15-26.
Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder and OCD.
The relationship between Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder (a 
personality disorder) and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (an anxiety disorder) has been 
addressed by several studies. The obsessional personality, constitutional disposition, or 
temperament is typically identified by the following personality traits: "orderliness, 
cleanliness, fastidiousness, meticulousness, parsimony, pedantry, persistence, endurance, 
and unemotionality" (Marks, 1987, p.438). In addition the obsessional personality has a 
distinct cognitive style showing "intellectual rigidity and focussing on details, being 
deliberate in thought and action, and highly moralistic about self and others" 
(Emmelkamp, 1982, p.188; Pollack, 1979).
In one such study Kringlen (1965) compared the premorbid personality 
traits of obsessional patients with those of nonobsessional, neurotic, control patients. 
Seventy-two percent of the obsessional patients and 53% of the control patients were 
rated to have premorbid obsessional traits. Thus significantly more obsessional than 
control patients had premorbid obsessional personality traits, but such traits were also 
frequent in neurotic controls.
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Subsequently Black (1974) in his literature review on the relationship 
between OCD and obsessional personality traits found on average that 71% of OCD 
patients had marked or moderate premorbid obsessive traits. However a substantial 
minority of those with OCD did not have an obsessive personality premorbidly (16% to 
36% in five series reviewed by Black, 1974).
Finally Pollack’s (1987) more recent review of the literature concluded 
that OCD appears to be more frequently associated with premorbid obsessive compulsive 
personality patterns than with other personality patterns. However Kringlen’s (1965) 
study and those reviewed by Black (1974) and Pollack (1987) were retrospective and did 
not include adequate controls.
Rapoport (1990) claims that only 20% of the hundreds of OCD clients she 
has seen since 1974 fit the description of the obsessional personality. Her clinical 
experience is that "Many [OCDs] with perfectionist strivings or rituals are in fact highly 
selective in what to be perfect about, or where to clean up" (p.92). Unlike those with 
obsessive personality disorder, the OCDs display obsessional behaviour that is not 
generalized. Such reports throw doubt on the previous findings from retrospective studies 
and suggest that an obsessional personality is not necessarily important in the experience 
of OCD. In contrast to these studies, the present research investigates the role of 
H. J. Eysenck, M. W. Eysenck, and Barretts’ (1985) normal personality dimensions in 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour.
Depression and Obsessions and Compulsions.
As already noted, early English explanations of OCD stressed religious 
thought content and a relationship to melancholy (Johnson, 1759; Maudsley, 1895; 
Taylor, 1660). Since then numerous studies of both normal and clinical populations have 
reported a relationship, though not a necessary one, between depression and obsessive- 
compulsive behaviour. Typically depression has been found to either accompany or 
exacerbate obsessions and compulsions. But as with many studies of OCD and 
obsessional personality traits most of this evidence comes from retrospective clinical 
analyses. This precludes firm conclusions about the functional relationship between the 
two phenomena (Sutherland, Newman & Rachman, 1982).
This evidence comes from a variety of types of studies. These include 
studies of clinical and normal obsessions and compulsions, psychobiological studies of 
clinical OCD, and treatment outcome studies of OCD.
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Studies o f Depression and Clinical OCD.
In one such retrospective study of 398 depressed clients Gittleson (1966) 
found 124 or 31.2% had obsessional thoughts either preceding or concurrent with the 
depression. Vaughan (1976) reported similar findings.
Videbech (1975) found that for depressed clients who also had obsessions 
the percentage of those with one or more obsessions rose from 23% to 66% during a 
depressive episode. From this study it appears for depressed clients episodes of 
depression increase obsessions. Curiously Gittleson (1966) found the opposite trend for a 
small subsample (13) in his study: obsessions decreased, and sometimes ceased with the 
onset of depression. From these studies of depressed patients it appears there is not a 
consistent pattern of relationships between depression and OCD.
By contrast Weiner, Reich, Robins, Fishman, and van Doren (1976) 
investigated a sample of obsessional clients. They found that the frequency of the 
transition from obsessions to depression was three times more common than for its 
converse. Also the incidence of depressive symptoms increased during periods of 
heightened obsessional activity. In fact Rasmussen and Tsuang (1986) reported that 
amongst 44 DSM-111 (1980) diagnosed OCDs most had concomitant or lifetime histories 
of a major depressive disorder or another anxiety disorder. Thus these studies suggest 
that for OCD patients, depression is a frequent concomitant.
Taking these studies together, the firmest prediction that can be made is 
that obsessive-compulsive clients will be prone to develop depression and, less frequently, 
depressive clients will be prone to develop obsessions and compulsions (Rachman, 1978).
Psychobiological Studies o f Depression and Clinical OCD.
Psychobiological studies also suggest that there are both common and 
unique features of OCD and depression. In one such study, Zohar and Insel (1987) found 
that on certain biological measures OCD clients resembled those with a major depressive 
disorder. Thus similar results were found on the Dexamethasone Suppression Test, and 
for rapid eye movement latency on the sleep electroencephalogram. However differences 
were evident on other biological measures such as REM density, platelet serotonin 
uptake, and H-imipramine binding. Also OCD clients may show, unlike depressives, an 
elevated level of the serotonin metabolite (5-hydroxy-indoleacetic acid) in the 
cerebrospinal fluid.
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These results could be interpreted as evidence for at least some 
psychobiological overlap between OCD and depression. There are also differences. 
However, given that the etiological significance of each of these "markers" remains highly 
speculative, such conclusions can only be tentative. Other approaches such as the 
following comparison of responses to the same biological treatments are more conclusive.
Outcomes for Depression and OCD using Common Biological Treatments.
Clomipramine, a tricyclic antidepressant, has been found to be effective in 
treating OCD. However it was in the course of treating clients with a depressive illness 
that its additional effect on obsessional symptoms was first noted (Cordoba & Lopez- 
Ibor, cited in Ananth, 1985). Subsequently several studies have shown that, even in 
nondepressed clients, Clomipramine significantly reduces OCD symptoms (DeVeaugh* 
Geiss, Landau & Katz, 1989; Jenike, 1990). To date Clomipramine has the most 
consistent and significant specific effect on OCD behaviour.
However Clomipramine is ineffective for at least one third of OCD clients 
(Rapoport, 1990). Furthermore clinical signs of OCD severity are not a sufficient basis 
for the prediction of effectiveness. Nonetheless it appears there may be a similar 
deficiency of the neurotransmitter serotonin in both depressives and some OCDs. One 
possible explanation of how clomipramine may redress this deficiency in OCD is that it 
blocks serotonin reuptake in the brain (Crino, 1990).
Thus there is evidence that OCD and depression have some common 
biological markers and an apparent similar deficiency of the neurotransmitter serotonin. 
This suggests for some clients there may be a common biological component to OCD and 
depression.
Studies o f Depression and Normal Obsessions and Compulsions.
Studies of normal obsessions and compulsions have generally found a 
significant but weaker relationship with depression than was found for the clinical groups. 
For example Sternberger and Burns (1990) reported for their normal American 
population a significant correlation of 0.55 between obsessions and compulsions and 
depression. The former were measured by Sanavio’s (1988) Padua Inventory and 
depression by Derogatis’ (1983) Symptom Checklist-90 Revised. Similarly Sanavio, 
Bertolotti, Michielin, Vidotto, and Zotti (1986) reported a significant relationship 
between depression and severity of obsessions and compulsions. In fact this relationship
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increased with age for the normal Italian sample tested. They used the Maudsley 
Obsessional-Compulsive Questionnaire (MOCQ) (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977) and the 
Depression Questionnaire (Sanavio et al., 1986).
In 1986, Dent and Salkovskis reported a correlation of 0.49 between 
depression and obsessions and compulsions in their sample of medical, university, and 
non-students. Depression was measured by the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961) and obsessions and compulsions by the MOCQ 
(Hodgson & Rachman, 1977). Similar findings were reported for normal populations by 
several researchers including Rachman and De Silva (1978), Teasdale (1983), and 
Edwards and Dickerson (1987).
Taken together these studies of clinical and normal obsessions and 
compulsions suggest obsessive-compulsive behaviour can exist without depression, but 
that there is a close relationship between them. Of even greater interest the clinical 
studies of drug treatments point to the possibility of a common underlying biological 
imbalance in both depression and some OCDs. Thus it appears depression plays a most 
important though as yet unclear role in obsessive-compulsive behaviour and accordingly 
should be included in any such investigation.
Genetic versus Environmental Factors.
OCD is more prevalent among the relatives of OCD sufferers than among 
the general population. This suggests a possible genetic cause (Rapoport, 1989). Also 
several instances of monozygotic twins who were concordant for obsessionality have been 
reported in the literature (Parker, 1964).
However as Emmelkamp (1982) notes the findings from both of these 
types of studies could just as strongly implicate environmental as genetic factors. 
Rapoport (1990) considers this unlikely. Her experience is that parents keep their 
(compulsive) habits secret from their children, just as they keep them secret from 
everyone else. This throws some doubt on the hypothesis of environmental influence. 
However a more convincing argument against a "modelling theory" of OCD is that it is 
rare to see a child and a parent with the same obsessions or compulsions. For example 
one of Dr Rapoport’s (1990) clients "Sam" had mental rituals, while his son "Zac" was 
compelled to wash, and a "Dr S". checked while his son "Jeffery" did his "stringing" rituals.
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Such examples are consistent with the presence of an underlying biological predisposition 
that is genetically transferable.
Rapoport (1990) claims OCD is a genetic disease connected with 
neurological illnesses, often of the basal ganglia. The basis of substantiation is her own 
clinical experience and the findings from three independent laboratory studies that the 
caudate nucleus (one portion of the basal ganglia), and portions of the frontal lobes, 
behave differently in clients with OCD. Therefore, given increased familial incidence and 
the findings from monozygotic twin and neuropathology studies, it seems that evidence 
for a biological and possibly genetic basis of OCD cannot be disregarded.
Biological and Cognitive-behavioural Factors; Treatment Outcome Studies of OCD.
OCD treatment studies of the past twenty years also suggest the 
importance of depression (biological) in many cases and of learned (excluding modelling) 
behaviour in most. Prior to the 1960s, however, the prognosis for obsessive compulsive 
disorder was poor. Recommended treatments were psychotherapy, long term 
hospitalization, and psychosurgery. Then over the past two decades two effective 
treatment methods were developed: behaviour therapy and pharmacotherapy with 
clomipramine. In 1966 Meyer first successfully treated OCD using the behaviour therapy 
techniques of exposure and response prevention. Since then a large number of controlled 
and uncontrolled studies have been conducted (Crino, 1990). These indicate that 75% of 
patients with obsessive compulsive rituals show significant gains using these behavioural 
techniques (reviewed by Foa, Steketee & Ozarow; 1985).
Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989a, 1989b) cognitive-behavioural model of OCD 
proposes that these methods are effective because they disrupt the conditioned pairing of 
obsessional thoughts with anxiety. This is effected by extinguishing the anxiety-reducing 
ritualistic (thought or behaviour) response.
Also, as mentioned above, since the 1980s there have been a number of 
controlled clinical trials of the tricyclic antidepressant clomipramine, (Jenike, 1990; 
Rapoport, Elkins & Mikhelsen, 1980). In general these controlled trials have found that 
clomipramine is more effective than other tricyclic antidepressants, monoamine oxidase 
inhibitors, or placebo (DeVeaugh-Geiss et al., 1989). Indirectly these findings suggest a 
biological factor in OCD.
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However few studies have adequately compared the effectiveness of 
behaviour therapy and (or) clomipramine. Nor have they established whether, for 
instance, the more serious the disorder the more essential is pharmacological treatment. 
What evidence there is is equivocal as some moderate and more severe cases of OCD are 
resistant to clomipramine treatment (Jenike, Armentano & Baer, 1987).
Nonetheless current findings suggest exposure and response prevention 
are usually successful, provided any pre or co-existing depression is treated first. However 
it has also been found that biological treatment with clomipramine is particularly 
successful in treating obsessions, as well as obsessions and depression. In contrast 
behaviour therapy is specifically effective in extinguishing compulsive behaviours. Thus, 
in the range of individual experiences of obsessions and compulsions, both biological and 
learning factors appear to play a role.
Summary of Predisposing and Co-varving Factors.
In summary, there is some evidence that genetic and biological factors and 
(or) the existence of depression may predispose individuals to the experience of 
obsessions and compulsions. Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder is only 
sometimes important, and typically, age, sex, social class, intelligence, and culture are not 
implicated.
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF OCD
However of even greater potential importance are the existing theoretical 
formulations of OCD from which such factors emerged. Psychoanalytic, cognitive, 
learning, cortical arousal, and cognitive-behavioural theories have each made their own 
contribution to the understanding of OCD. This study attempts to incorporate the key 
aspects of the range of factors suggested by these theoretical positions into a refined 
Eysenckian (biological) cortical arousal theory of OCD. This refinement consists of the 
inclusion of a cognitive appraisal measure of "responsibility", one of the traits of 
psychoticism, into a predictive equation for obsessive-compulsive behaviour. Of particular 
relevance to the present study are the contributions of cognitive, learning, cortical 
arousal, and cognitive-behavioural theories to the understanding of obsessions and 
compulsions.
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Cognitive Theories.
Cognitive theories have emphasized the high attentional involvement of 
uncontrollable obsessional thoughts whether they are pleasant or unpleasant (Legg 
England & Dickerson, 1988). Not surprisingly then it has been found that those with 
obsessions tend to be deficient in a variety of cognitive processing abilities such as 
decision making, allocating attention, classifying information, and judging probabilities 
(Fransella, 1974; Gordon, 1985; Mothersill & Neufeld, 1985; Persons & Foa, 1984). 
Furthermore, Legg England (1986) found that those with OCD will have impaired ability 
to perform problem-solving tasks because their attention will be focused on obsessions 
from which they have difficulty in disattending.
Such findings suggest an important descriptive refinement to what 
obsessional thoughts are and what responses they elicit. However cognitive theories in 
isolation cannot account for why it is that in some individuals excessive attention is 
directed to obsessional thoughts.
Learning Theories.
Classical conditioning learning theories describe the maintenance of OCD 
in terms of paired associations between the obsessions and anxiety or fear after a 
triggering traumatic event. Eysenck and Rachman (1965) proposed that all dysthymic 
disorders were due to classical conditioning of fear responses. However according to 
Emmelkamp (1982) there is little evidence to support this interpretation as identifiable 
triggering events occur in OCD as frequently as not. Also some obsessions appear 
resistant to extinction by behaviour therapy techniques based on learning theory alone.
By contrast operant conditioning theories emphasize the reinforcing role 
of anxiety reduction through the compulsive behavioural response to the anxiety elicited 
(Mather, 1970). Predictions from learning theories have suggested that if the anxiety- 
reducing response is prevented, and the client learns to pair relaxation with the stimulus 
thought, the compulsive behaviour response will be extinguished. However as for 
cognitive theory operant learning approaches are insufficient in themselves to explain 
individual differences in responses to obsessions. Some habituate to obsessions 
immediately, whereas others respond with anxiety and are slow to get used to them. The 
intriguing question is why?
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Cortical Arousal Theories.
The cortical arousal theories of individual difference as outlined by 
H. J. Eysenck (1957, 1967, 1981, 1987) and Gray (1970, 1981) appear to best account for 
individual variation in the experience of obsessions and compulsions. These theories 
predict that the particular individual combination of three biologically based personality 
dimensions will, in interaction with the environment, enable predictions about how the 
individual acquires and extinguishes behaviour. However in their explanation of OCD, 
H. J. Eysenck and M. W. Eysenck (1985) have focused on the role of the extraversion and 
neuroticism dimensions and given little attention to the potential role of psychoticism. On 
the basis of Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989a, 1989b) findings the present study also explores the 
additional contribution to OCD of the psychoticism dimension through one of its traits, 
responsibility.
Thus H. J. Eysenck and M. W. Eysenck (1985) argue that those in a state 
of high cortical arousal (as measured by a high introversion score) who have strong 
reactions to stimuli (as measured by a high neuroticism score), will be more likely to 
condition to obsessions and compulsions and to be resistant to their extinction (or slow to 
habituate). That is, they will tend to give intrusive thoughts excessive attention and feel 
compelled to continue to do so. Hence, unlike the majority of individuals, they will be 
distressed by their obsessions and compulsions. Perhaps this is partly because they 
experience them as uncontrollable.
What is the Cortical Arousal Explanation of Individual Differences?
An arousal theory of the biological basis of individual differences was in 
fact first proposed by the Austrian Psychiatrist Otto Gross (1902). He put forward an 
arousal view of the causal factors in extraverted and introverted behaviours, personality 
concepts traceable to the four temperaments theory of the ancient Greek Physician, 
Galen.
Then 44 years ago, Eysenck (1947) proposed a three-dimensional 
descriptive model of personality including introversion-extraversion (E), neuroticism (N), 
and psychoticism (P). His model was an hierarchical one that conceptualized each of 
three broad dimensions or types subdivided at a lower level into narrower and more 
specific traits. For example, the neuroticism dimension or type was defined by the 
interrelationships of the traits anxious, depressed, guilt feelings, low self-esteem, tense, 
irrational, shy, moody, and emotional.
18
Subsequently he developed a psychobiological arousal model to provide a 
causative explanation of the three dimensions (Eysenck, 1957, 1967, 1981, 1987). Eysenck 
(1957) initially described the psychobiology of extraversion and introversion in terms of 
the constructs "excitation" and "inhibition" (as they were employed by Pavlov (1927) and 
Hull (1943)). These constructs were conceived as hypothetical neural processes upon 
which the acquisition and extinction of behaviour depended. Eysenck proposed introverts 
were characterized by higher levels of cortical excitability and lower levels of cortical 
inhibition than extraverts. predicting introverts would display enhanced sensitivity and 
efficiency in the process of sensory stimulation and in conditioning.
Based on this theory he developed the Eysenck Personality Inventory or 
EPI (1959), a self report questionnaire measure of personality. Eysenck employed the 
method of factor analysis to order individual test items into traits, and the association of 
traits into types.
In 1967, drawing on developments in physiological psychology, he 
extended his 1957 causal explanation to a two level arousal system. In this proposal, 
cortical arousal (high for introverts and low for extroverts) was responsible for 
introversion-extraversion differences. However differences in the dimension neuroticism- 
stability were due to limbic arousal or activation which was high for neurotics, low for 
stables (Eysenck, 1987, p.l).
According to Eysenck these levels of cortical arousal were "produced by 
differential thresholds and reactions to the reticular activating system and its reciprocal 
relations with the cortex" (Eysenck, 1987, p.l). Limbic activation was related to the 
activities of the sympathetic (which produces physical manifestations of emotions, e.g., 
sweating) and the parasympathetic system (which returns these physical manifestations 
back to normal) (Eysenck, 1987). The physiological structure alleged to underlie the 
neuroticism dimension is the visceral brain or limbic system which comprises the 
amygdala, hippocampus, septum, cingulum, and hypothalamus. These physiological 
structures relating to neuroticism are mainly concerned with emotion.
The two subsequent revisions to the EPI (1959) - the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire or EPQ (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) and the EPQ-R (Eysenck, Eysenck & 
Barrett, 1987) - have been guided by the above biological conceptualizations and their 
adequate empirical testing. These revisions have also produced psychometric and 
conceptual refinements.
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A particularly important aspect of Eysenck’s theory was his prediction 
that, because the three dimensions were continuous, any personality whether normal or 
abnormal could be diagramatically represented in three dimensional space.
Such predictions prompted a burst of research activity in the 1950s and 
1960s, in which relationships between personality dimensions and broad "psychiatric" 
classifications were explored. However since that time there has been little interest in the 
literature in exploring Eysenck’s biologically based personality dimensions and their 
relation to individual variation in, for instance, the experience of obsessions and 
compulsions. This was largely because of the work of writers such as Mischel (1969), 
Shweder (1975), and D’Andrade (1965) who tried to substitute trait psychology with 
"situationalism". During the 1970s their work was regarded as affording a serious 
challenge to the viability of conceptualizations of relatively stable personality dimensions.
Since then there has been a revival of interest in factor models of stable 
personality dimensions. Some researchers, for example, John (1989), McCrae (1989), and 
Zuckerman, Kuhlman, and Camac (1988) have proposed a five factor model. Yet recent 
extensive research has demonstrated that Eysenck’s three dimensions are the central 
underlying descriptive factors in all personalities, as measured by a variety of 
questionnaires (Digman, 1990; Eysenck & Eysenck 1985; McKenzie 1988).
This dimensional feature of Eysenck’s scale lends itself well to the testing 
of recent conceptualizations of obsessions and compulsions. Such conceptualizations 
propose that the major difference in the experience of obsessions and compulsions by 
clinicals and normals is quantitative: one of degree of disturbance or discomfort evoked. 
What then is the empirical evidence for a cortical arousal theory of Eysenck’s three 
personality dimensions?
Empirical Evidence Supporting a Cortical Arousal Theory of Introversion-Extraversion.
The simple notion that introverts have a chronically higher level of cortical 
arousal than extraverts has proven extraordinarily successful in accounting for an 
enormous variety of findings. Eysenck & Eysenck (1985) reported that a huge volume of 
research has successfully identified many significant behavioural differences between 
introverts and extraverts in the performance of the following tasks:
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classical conditioning, operant conditioning, sensory thresholds, pain 
tolerance, vigilance, sensory deprivation, time estimation, perceptual 
defense, critical flicker fusion, visual constancies, sleep-wakefulness 
patterns, verbal learning, figural after effects, visual masking, rest pauses 
in tapping, speech patterns, expressive behaviour, and reminiscence 
(p.237).
Of particular relevance to the questions being explored in this research is 
the finding that introverts generally condition better than extraverts and also habituate 
(get used) to stimuli more slowly. Eysenck and Eysenck (1985) claimed it was likely that 
part of the slowness to habituate shown by introverts reflected their high level of arousal. 
However he added "We know roughly what is happening, but not why it is happening" 
(p.223).
By contrast few researchers have shown research interest in 
psychobiological evidence linking neuroticism, arousal, and performance. Gray (1981) has 
been one of the exceptions and his work in this area which pertains to OCD in particular 
is discussed below.
Finally the psychoticism dimension is less well developed than 
introversion and neuroticism at both the descriptive and the causal theoretical level. 
According to Eysenck "the evidence does not suggest that arousal can explain the major 
facts known about P" (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976, p.ix). Rather "genetic factors are 
responsible for 81 percent of all the reliably measured differences in P between subjects" 
(p.x). However psychoticism provides a point of integration for Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989a, 
1989b) recent cognitive-behavioural research.
Thus for introversion the evidence is consistent with a biological arousal 
explanation. However, what evidence is there that a cortical arousal theory is relevant to 
the understanding of OCD?
Cortical Arousal Theory and OCD.
Some biological arousal (e.g., Rachman & Hodgson, 1980) and cognitive 
(e.g., Legg England & Dickerson, 1988) theories have proposed that the uncontrollability 
of obsessional thoughts is due to their arousing nature. Beech and Perigault (1974) 
advanced on this notion by highlighting characteristics not only of the thoughts, but of the 
individual experiencing them. Similarly to Eysenck and Gray, they considered that it was 
the combination of excessive arousal in the individual as well as the arousing nature of
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the thoughts that was crucial. This led to learned associations between obsessions and 
anxiety which were resistant to extinction in OCD.
In fact as early as 1957 Eysenck predicted that neurotic introverts were 
the people most likely to suffer from dysthymia, a term which includes not only obsessive- 
compulsive behaviour, but anxiety states, phobias, and neurotic depression. He was 
thereby ambitiously proposing a link between genetically determined individual 
differences in arousal and psychological abnormality.
Subsequently Eysenck and Rachman (1965) attempted an explanation; 
they regarded all dysthymic neuroses as disorders of over-socialization. They 
hypothesized that in the introverted neurotic the establishment of the conscience (treated 
by Eysenck (1964) as a cluster of classically conditioned fear reactions) had proceeded so 
effectively that the individual concerned was disabled in adulthood by a variety of 
manifestations of his (or her) conditioned fears (in the form of obsessions and 
compulsions, phobias, anxiety states, reactive depression, or other dysthymic symptoms).
Gray (1970), arguing on the basis of cortical arousal theory, agreed with 
Eysenck (1957) that dysthymics would tend to be introverted neurotics. However he 
disagreed with Eysenck’s explanation. Eysenck proposed that the dysthymic behaviour of 
introverts was due to their better general conditionability, in this instance to fears. Gray 
(1970, 1973) considered rather that this behaviour was due to the greater susceptibility of 
introverts to specifically negative reinforcement. In support of Gray’s theory Nagpal and 
Gupta (1979) found that neurotic introverts showed the greatest amount of conditioning 
with negative reinforcement, whereas it was the neurotic extraverts (high impulsives) who 
conditioned best with positive reinforcement. As stated above, one prediction arising 
from this arousal-learning theory, is that the compulsive behaviour in OCD would be 
more readily conditioned in the introvert than the extravert. This could be because the 
reinforcement provided by the associated anxiety reduction is a negative not a positive 
reinforcer.
In 1981 Gray ventured an explanation of OCD specifically, where 
previously he had dealt with dysthymic disorders generally. He proposed that the 
checking rituals of OCD could be interpreted as reflecting an overactive behavioural 
inhibition system (especially the septo-hippocampal system) engaged in an unremitting 
scan for potential threats of disruption and/or an unremitting check that "important" 
predictions were indeed verified by environmental events. What Gray (1981) refers to as 
an "an overactive behavioural inhibition system" in fact describes the combined action of
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highly aroused cortical and limbic systems (as described by Eysenck (1967, 1981, 1985). 
Given also that Gray (1981) is referring to OCD in highly introverted neurotics his 
explanation of OCD appears generally consistent with Eysenck’s arousal theory. Further 
they both agree that those with obsessive-compulsive disorder will be more susceptible to 
reinforcement. They differ only on the type of reinforcement that is important.
However Gray’s (1981) description was derived largely from observations 
of the behaviour of animals with either hippocampal or septal lesions, or both. It is as yet 
unconfirmed in humans. Clearly then a cortical arousal theory of OCD requires further 
research and development. The prime interest in this research - an exploration of 
measures of individual difference as they relate to obsessions and compulsions - can only 
provide an indirect test of the cortical arousal theory and OCD.
Nonetheless, as already mentioned, there have been a number of studies 
of Eysenck’s (1967) personality dimensions and broad psychiatric groups including OCD. 
Griffiths (1975) reported high introversion, high neuroticism, and low psychoticism 
(below the standardization groups) for neurotic depressives compared with male and 
female clients diagnosed as personality disorders, paranoid schizophrenics, non-paranoid 
schizophrenics, and psychotic depressives. In a personal communication to Eysenck and 
Eysenck (1976, pp. 177-178) Rachman reported low psychoticism for obsessionals and for 
neurotics generally, in 116 male and 188 females diagnosed as neurotic. All the groups 
(anxiety states, depressives, phobics, sex disorders, obsessionals) averaged mean scores 
between 2.3 and 2.6 (females) and between 3.1 and 4.2 (males) on the psychoticism 
dimension.
Also Eysenck and Eysenck (1976) found that heightened emotional 
instability (neuroticism) was most pronounced amongst neurotics, endogenous 
depressives, and personality disorders. Kelly (1980) reported that compared to normal 
controls his obsessional clients had high mean scores on the Taylor Scale of Manifest 
Anxiety, and the neuroticism and introversion scales of the Maudsley Personality 
Inventory (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977).
In 1981 Sanchez-Turet, Vallejo-Ruiloba, Porta, and Cuadras administered 
the EPI (1964) to 300 psychiatrically diagnosed outpatients in Barcelona. They found 
obsessives and depressives constituted the more introverted groups, and hysterics, 
dysthymics, and reactive depressives the most neurotic. Finally in a 1986 study Kirkcaldy 
found endogenous depressives had high introversion and neuroticism scores compared 
with normals and psychotics.
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Taken together, these studies suggest high introversion and neuroticism 
and perhaps low psychoticism will be associated with dysthymic disorders in general and 
in a smaller number of studies, OCD in particular.
Psychoticism.
It is no accident that psychoticism is infrequently mentioned in the 
extensive research cited. Compared with introversion and neuroticism very little 
descriptive or theoretical work has been done on this personality dimension until very 
recently. What has been done then, and what status does H. J. Eysenck & 
S. B. G. Eysencks’ (1976) psychoticism dimension have in the arousal theory?
In 1970 Eysenck wrote "A factor P has been found relatively independent 
of neuroticism and extraversion both with adults and with children" (p.458). The extreme 
positive end of the psychoticism dimension represents a personality that is "solitary, 
troublesome, cruel, lacking in feeling, lacking in empathy, hostile to others, sensation 
seeking, and liking odd and unusual things". Furthermore he stated that the psychoticism 
scale correlates with ratings of such traits as "immature, irresponsible, anti-authoritarian, 
difficult to handle, and independent" (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976, p.202).
In 1985, however, H. J. Eysenck and M. W. Eysenck described the 
following as the traits of P: aggressive, cold, egocentric, impersonal, impulsive, antisocial, 
unempathic, creative, and tough-minded. The most notable development from his 1976 
position was the treatment of impulsivity as a psychoticism trait, and the treatment of 
sensation-seeking as a trait of extraversion (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978). On the basis of 
their study of 271 students, Zuckerman et al. (1988) agree with the shift of impulsivity 
from E to P. However, they claim the locus of sensation-seeking is also in the P factor 
rather than E.
Further Zuckerman et al. (1988) claimed their research supported the P 
scale as a good marker for this third and complex factor. They described the negative pole 
of the P factor as defined by "socialization, cognitive structure, responsibility, restraint, 
and social desirability" (p.99). However it is difficult to characterize the P factor in terms 
of a single normal dimensional name; there are numerous traits involved in the factor. 
Psychopathy may be an improvement on psychoticism (Hare & Schalling, 1978) but 
neither label incorporates such P traits as autonomy, nonconformity, or creativity 
(Zuckerman et al., 1988).
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Cortical Arousal Theory and Psychoticism.
As already noted Eysenck claims there is no current evidence that arousal 
theory can explain the main facts known about psychoticism. This is clearly a flaw in the 
cortical arousal theory. However in the absence of a better one to date, the broad 
Eysenckian personality dimensions (including psychoticism) and Eysenck’s explanatory 
arousal causal theory will be employed. In fact the recently reported studies of Salkovskis 
(1985, 1989a, 1989b) and colleagues, prompt the testing of an important refinement to 
earlier predictions linking OCD and psychoticism.
Cognitive-behavioural Theory.
Salkovskis’ (1985) cognitive-behavioural account of OCD attributes a 
central role to the post-obsession cognitive appraisal that "if something is not done" to 
counteract the obsession, the person will be responsible for the obsession happening. This 
will result in harm to self or others. Salkovskis claims that those individuals with a 
heightened sense of responsibility will be more likely to appraise thoughts in such a way 
that they become obsessional. Such an account is consistent with the basic assumptions 
commonly adopted by the range of cognitive theorists such as Beck (1976), Rachman 
(1983), and Teasdale (1983). Briefly, these are (i) that emotions result from the appraisal 
of events (including thoughts); (ii) that pre-existing cognitive structures and processes 
(e.g., beliefs, attitudes) influence appraisal; (iii) that appraisal and emotional responses 
tend to have a reciprocal relationship. Thus Salkovskis (1989a) claims it is the particular 
type of thought appraisal, that of excessive responsibility, that distinguishes the obsessive- 
compulsive from those with anxiety or depression. Anxiety and depression he considers 
are associated simply with thought appraisals of harm and danger without any additional 
attribution of responsibility concerning them.
Of further importance is Salkosvkis (1989a) hypothesis that in OCD, such 
excessively responsible appraisals of intrusive thoughts are necessarily linked with both 
distress and the occurrence of neutralizing behaviour. Neutralizing he defines as 
"voluntarily initiated activity which is intended to have the effect of reducing the 
perceived responsibility and can be overt or covert (compulsive behaviour or thought 
rituals) (p.678). This neutralizing activity tends to increase the likelihood of further 
intrusive thoughts by operating as a negative reinforcer for the anxiety and discomfort 
produced.
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However, according to Eysenck, "irresponsibility/responsibility" is one of 
the traits which make up the psychoticism dimension. Given Salkovskis (1989a) claims 
about the importance of responsibility, perhaps Eysenck’s dimensions can better predict 
OCD when the psychoticism trait "responsibility" is also measured. There is clinical, 
theoretical, and experimental evidence which provides a strong basis for testing such an 
hypothesis in the present study.
Clinical Evidence.
Rachman and Hodgson (1980) stated "Our clinical impression is that 
[clients] whose main complaint consists of intrusive, unacceptable thoughts are correct, 
upright, moral citizens, who aspire to high standards of personal conduct .... The 
thresholds for personal acceptability (of the nonclinical sample) were significantly lower 
and wider than those of the [clients]" (p.16). Thus they described identifiable and 
consistent individual differences in something akin to the trait responsibility in the 
normal and the clinical experience of obsessions and compulsions. Similarly Rachman 
(1971) hypothesized "In addition to introversion which is related to general sensitivity, 
[clients] may be particularly sensitive to distasteful or shameful thoughts because they 
have been subjected to critical or strict moral [or] religious training" (pp.232-233).
Theoretical Support.
On the basis of extensive clinical experience with OCD, Insel (1990) 
proposed a model which predicted that those who had a "predilection to guilt due to a 
heightened sense of responsibility" were more likely to develop OCD (p.7). Gray (1970) 
noted that "obsessive compulsives are more susceptible to fear" (p.255). Thus one would 
expect them, unlike normals, to take their obsessions more seriously (and responsibly), 
and consequently develop the avoidance behaviour which results in failure to habituate to 
the obsession.
Thus it appears it is not the having of obsessions in itself that is 
problematic. Rather it is the (responsible) way in which they are appraised. Rachman 
(1971) hypothesized that such an appraisal will tend to be made by someone who is 
introverted or already generally sensitive. The present study explores the proposal that it 
is such combinations of factors which affect how the intrusive thoughts are experienced. 
However, what is the empirical evidence for the importance of the responsibility 
variable?
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Experimental Evidence.
To date there is only one study (Salkovskis & Dent, 1989) which directly 
tests Salkovskis’ cognitive-behavioural account in which responsible appraisals of 
thoughts are the key factor. Salkovskis (1989b) reported on the study which included 243 
non-clinical subjects. Those who reported they "did something", either cognitively or 
behaviourally in response to their thoughts, scored significantly higher on the Maudsley 
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977). Those who neutralized 
(or did something in response to their thought) also had "significantly higher scores on 
belief ratings of attitudes concerning responsibility for harm" (p.207). Thus for a 
nonclinical sample a correlation between obsessions and compulsions and "responsibility 
for harm" was established.
Treatment studies provide additional, though necessarily indirect, support 
for this cognitive-behavioural hypothesis. Emmelkamp and colleagues have reported two 
controlled studies demonstrating that a cognitive intervention was as effective as 
exposure with response prevention (Emmelkamp, 1988; Emmelkamp, Visser & Hoekstra, 
1988). Salkovskis (1989a) claims the emphasis appears to have been on modifying the way 
patients interpreted their obsessional thoughts (personal communication, Hoekstra to 
Salkovskis).
Thus something akin to the trait responsibility has been noted in the 
literature at least since Rachman’s (1971) reported clinical findings. However it has been 
the more recent research by Salkovskis and colleagues that has given the trait such 
prominent theoretical importance in OCD (Salkovskis & Dent, 1986, 1989; Salkovskis & 
Warwick, 1988; Salkovskis & Westbrook, 1987, 1989).
Taken together, these studies suggest individual differences in appraised 
responsibility may account for some of the differences in self-reported distress attributed 
to obsessive and compulsive behaviour.
RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENT STUDY.
In the present study a normal sample was chosen as the prime focus of an 
investigation into obsessions and compulsions. A small pilot clinical sample was also 
examined. This latter sample was included for two important reasons. First, to provide 
some test for the validity of the assumption that there is a continuum in the experience of 
obsessions and compulsions in the population. Secondly, to test the related assumption
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that obsessions and compulsions can therefore legitimately be studied using the larger 
and more accessible normal samples. Both assumptions are based on findings from the 
past two decades of research that normals and clinicals only differ quantitatively in their 
experience of obsessions and compulsions. Typically the main difference was in the 
amount of disturbance or distress caused by the obsessions and compulsions. In the 
present study the Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988), a recently developed scale, was the 
criterion measure. This was because it encapsulates the findings from recent factor 
studies in its dimensional measure of disturbance attributed to obsessions and 
compulsions. It is also the only existing measure of obsessive-compulsive in normal and 
clinical samples.
In addition to this factorial descriptive research, recent treatment 
outcome studies have claimed success with cognitive behavioural and pharmacological 
(biological) approaches. Added to this are decades of research reporting a relationship 
between depression and obsessive-compulsive behaviour and between OCD and high 
introversion and neuroticism. The impetus for this research is to explore the ability of 
Eysenck’s personality dimensions (with their underlying cortical arousal theory) to 
incorporate this range of findings. His replicable, dimensional, and biologically based 
measures of individual difference seem particularly apt for the present study of 
obsessions and compulsions.
However it is proposed that his model is enhanced in its predictive power 
when a measure of "exaggerated beliefs about responsibility for behaviour" is added. 
H. J. Eysenck and M. W. Eysenck (1985) support such an approach. They propose that 
studies of particular behaviours can isolate those traits that enhance prediction over and 
above what is afforded by E, N, and P. Responsibility is the central variable in Salkovskis’ 
(1985, 1989a, 1989b) cognitive-behavioural account of obsessions and compulsions. 
Accordingly a scale was developed based entirely on Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989a, 1989b) 
conceptualizations of this variable. It is proposed that this variable could be a reflection 
of an underlying personality trait of psychoticism: responsibility/irresponsibility.
Finally, though age and sex were not usually implicated in obsessions and 
compulsions, recent studies of the Padua Inventory suggest that they are. Also, though 
neither a necessary nor a causal link with obsessions and compulsions has been 
established, depression is frequently reported as an important correlate. Accordingly 
individual differences due to age, sex, and depression were controlled so that the 
individual difference measures of interest - the Eysenckian dimensions and responsibility 
- could be investigated.
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Consideration of the research findings recorded in the literature suggest, therefore, the 
following hypotheses:
HYPOTHESES.
(1) Total scores on the Padua Inventory will be positively correlated with 
neuroticism, responsibility, depression, and the female sex, but negatively correlated with 
extraversion, psychoticism, and age.
(2) Differences in neuroticism and extraversion have added explanatory
power in the prediction of obsessive-compulsive behaviour beyond that afforded by
differences in age, sex, and depression.
(3) Differences in psychoticism have added explanatory power in the
prediction of obsessive-compulsive behaviour, over that of neuroticism and extraversion, 
and beyond that afforded by differences in age, sex, and depression.
(4) Differences in responsibility have added explanatory power in the
prediction of obsessive-compulsive behaviour over that of neuroticism, extraversion and 
psychoticism, and beyond that afforded by differences in age, sex, and depression.
(5) Zero order correlations of similar magnitude and the same direction will 
be found for the clinical sample.
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METHOD
SUBJECTS.
The Normal Sample.
Questionnaires were distributed to 250 first year Psychology students from 
the Australian National University. Students received course credit for returning the 
questionnaire within two weeks of distribution. The 155 returned yielded a return rate of 
62%. Of the 151 retained for analysis, 65% (98) were female and 35% (53) were male. 
Subjects’ ages ranged from 17 to 47 years with a mean age of 20.55 years (SD = 5.37).
The Clinical Sample.
In addition, as a pilot study, the questionnaire was distributed to 20 
subjects diagnosed as Obsessive Compulsive according to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual 111 Revised (1987). These subjects were attending the St. Vincent’s Anxiety 
Disorders Clinic in Darlinghurst, Sydney. As a routine part of clinical assessment and 
research procedures, all newly referred clients to the clinic are required to complete 
several questionnaires. Accordingly the administration of the questionnaire for this study 
would have extended not introduced this process thereby causing minimal disruption. Of 
the 20 subjects, 55% (11) were female and 45% (9) were male. Their ages ranged from 19 
to 44 years with a mean age of 29.55 years (SD = 7.29). Voluntary participation and 
confidentiality was assured to all subjects whether normal or clinical.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE.
The same questionnaire was administered to the normal and the pilot 
clinical samples (see Appendix A, pp.1-12). The data for the normal sample was collected 
over a two week period. By contrast data collection for the clinical sample extended over 
seven months as those diagnosed as OCD tended to present at the clinic at the rate of 
approximately one or two per fortnight.
MEASURES.
The hypotheses required the measurement of demographic and individual 
difference variables. The two demographic variables were age (measured in years) and
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sex (measured as a dichotomous variable). The six individual difference variables were 
"severity of obsessions and compulsions" (the criterion measure), and depression, 
neuroticism, extraversion, psychoticism, and responsibility (the predictors).
The Criterion.
Severity of Obsessions and Compulsions.
The Padua Inventory or PI (Sanavio, 1988) is a recently developed 60-item 
self-report scale which measures severity of obsessions and compulsions (see Appendix A, 
pp.5-7). The items describe obsessional thoughts, e.g., "I invent doubts and problems 
about most of the things I do," and compulsive behaviours, e.g., "I find it difficult to touch 
garbage or dirty things." Subjects are instructed to rate each item on a 5-point scale 
(0 = not at all, l = a little, 2 = quite a lot, 3 = a lot, 4= very much). This measures the degree 
of disturbance caused by the thoughts and behaviours.
The total score is the sum of the ratings on the 60 items and the score 
range is 0-240. The PI is considered to measure the extent to which the obsessions and 
compulsions interfere with routine daily functioning (Sternberger & Burns, 1990), with a 
high score representing greater interference from obsessions and compulsions. As already 
discussed the PI was the measure of choice because it is the only self-report measure of 
normal and clinical samples which includes obsessional as well as compulsive dimensions.
Sanavio (1988) labelled the first PI obsessive factor "Impaired Control 
Over Mental Activities". This factor was composed of items measuring an inability to stop 
unpleasant thoughts or ruminations (e.g., "Unpleasant thoughts come into my mind 
against my will and I cannot get rid of them"). The second obsessive factor, "Urges and 
Worries of Losing Control over Motor Behaviour," involved fears that impulsive thoughts 
of a violent or sexual nature would be manifest in action (e.g., "I sometimes feel the need 
to break or damage things for no reason"). The two compulsive factors, "Becoming 
Contaminated" and "Checking Behaviours," were the two traditional Washing and 
Checking dimensions which prior research identified in the CAC and the MOCL 
(Sternberger & Burns, 1990).
The Padua was first trialled by Sanavio in 1988 on normal and clinical 
Italian subjects. Both sexes were comparably represented and the ages ranged from 16 to 
70 years (Sanavio, 1988). Then in 1990 Sternberger and Burns reported the psychometric 
properties of the Padua with an American College population of 19 year olds. In
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Australia, Crino and colleagues have been using the Padua Inventory since 1988 to 
measure obsessions and compulsions in their OCD clinical populations. They also have 
unpublished data on the psychometric properties of the Padua for a normal Australian 
sample of 79 from Maroubra, Sydney (R. D. Crino, personal communication, April 25, 
1991).
Internal Consistency.
For Sanavio’s (1988) Italian sample the internal consistency of the Padua 
Inventory (coefficient Alpha) was 0.90 in male and 0.94 in female subjects (p.171). Test- 
retest correlations were 0.78 for males and 0.83 for the females who filled out the 
inventory twice at a 30 day interval. For the normal sample in the present study 
Cronbach’s (1951) Alpha was 0.94 which was the same result reported by Sternberger and 
Burns (1990) for their American sample of 678 college students (M= 18.85, SD= 1.52). 
Hence the Padua Inventory can claim established internal consistency for normal samples 
in Italy, America, and Australia.
Validity.
The Padua Inventory also possesses demonstrated construct validity. For 
Sanavio’s (1988) Italian sample, the PI correlation with the Maudsley Obsessional- 
Compulsive Questionnaire (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977) was .70; with the Leyton 
Obsessional-Compulsive Inventory (Cooper, 1970) it was .71 with symptom and .66 with 
trait scales; and with the Self-Rating Obsessional Scale (Sandler & Hazari, 1960) the PI 
correlation was .61. It also has "divergent validity with respect to other neurotic disorders" 
(Sanavio, 1988, p.169).
Also Sternberger and Burns (1990) reported that the PI demonstrated 
convergent and divergent validity with the Symptom Checklist-90 Revised (SCL-R) 
(Derogatis, 1983) and the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (MOCI) (Hodgson 
& Rachman, 1977). They found the PI total score correlated significantly with the SCL-R 
obsessional scale. Moreover this correlation was significantly different from the Pi’s 
correlation with any other SCL-R subscale. In addition the corresponding subscales of the 
PI and MOCI correlated with one another, and these correlations were significantly 
different from the correlations between noncorresponding subscales.
In conclusion, though a comparatively new measure of obsessive and 
compulsive behaviour, the Padua Inventory has several features superior to that of other
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established scales. It has the advantages of being a self-report inventory, and of measuring 
severity of obsessive thoughts as well as compulsive behaviours in normal and clinical 
populations. Also, it possesses adequate internal consistency and validity for normal 
samples. To date, however, this writer is not cognizant of studies which demonstrate 
adequate psychometric properties for clinical samples. Future research needs to address 
this.
Predictors.
Responsibility Scale.
This research project was planned on the expectation that the 
responsibility questionnaire cited by Salkovskis and Dent (1986, 1989) and Salkovskis 
(1989b) would be supplied to this researcher. This did not eventuate, so a new scale was 
developed based on Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989a, 1989b) theoretical outline of his concept of 
responsibility.
Fourteen items were initially devised, including three which were reverse 
scored (items 4, 7, 9). These 14 items are given in Appendix A, pp.8-9). Each item was 
intended to elicit a response that indicated the degree to which the respondent held 
dysfunctional assumptions about responsibility for, blame for, or control of their thoughts 
(Salkovkis, 1985). For example, "If I have an intrusive thought of doing harm to myself or 
others, I would feel somehow responsible if harm were to come to them or to me". 
Subjects were asked to indicate to what extent each statement applied to them, by 
choosing one response from a five-point scale: (0 = not at all; l = a little; 2 = quite a lot; 
3 = a lot; 4= very much so), for each item. A higher score represented a greater degree of 
appraised responsibility.
Item Development.
Salkovskis (1985, 1989b) proposed a cognitive account of the development 
of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Central to this was his hypothesis: "Some individuals 
are vulnerable to interpreting intrusive thoughts as indicating that they may be 
responsible for harm to themselves or to other people" (Salkovskis, 1989b, p.201). Such 
individuals will hold a number of exaggerated assumptions about their thoughts. Items for 
this new scale were based on Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989b) description of five such typical 
dysfunctional assumptions.
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Thus, Item 2 and Item 7 (reverse scored) endeavoured to reflect 
Salkovskis’ (1985) statement: "Such ideas of responsibility can extend to having had the 
thought itself' (p.574), or the concept of "responsibility for having a thought." Items 5, 10, 
13, and 9 (reverse scored) were devised to tap his concept of control, or the dysfunctional 
belief: "One should (and can) exercise control over one’s thoughts" (p.579).
Items 3, 6, and 14 were devised to tap the dysfunctional belief: "If you have 
any doubt at all that you may have caused harm, then you must act to ensure that you are 
clear of blame" (Salkovskis, 1989b, p.202). Items 1 and 11, and 4 (reverse scored), 
attempted to explore the extent of "exaggerated notions about the extent to which actual 
harm can result from thoughts themselves" (Salkovskis, 1989b, p.201). Finally, items 8 and 
12 attempted to tap the extent of the belief: "Once you have thought about it, failing to 
prevent or try to prevent harm, is the same as having caused the harm" (Salkovkis, 1989b, 
p.202). Items 8 and 12 were positively worded after initial trialling. This was because of 
the difficulty in devising readily comprehensible statements reflecting the dysfunctional 
belief.
In summary, these five dysfunctional assumptions are the major 
identifying features of Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989a, 1989b) cognitive account of the 
development of OCD. Taken together they form the basis of a coherent explanation of 
how those with obsessive thoughts and compulsive behaviours view the world. That is, 
having had an intrusive thought (a normal experience), their thought appraisal is such 
that they feel unduly responsible: for having the thought, for acting in response to it, and 
for controlling it.
Reliability o f the Responsibility Scale.
Initial trialling and analyses.
After an initial trial and subsequent rewording of several items, the scale 
was administered to the normal sample. Reliability coefficients were calculated for the 
scale for each of the 14 items successively deleted. Reliability coefficients and corrected 
item-total correlations are given in Table 1. Individual deletion of Items 4, 7, 9, and 12 
yielded the highest values of Cronbach’s (1951) Alpha, though none of these represented 
a substantial increase in the overall average split-half reliability of the scale. However, 
Items 4, 7, and 9 were deleted despite this, and despite the fact that they constituted the
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Table 1.
Cronbach’s Alpha for the Responsibility Scale with each item deleted. N = 152 (Normals)
ITEM CORRECTED ITEM-TOTAL ALPHA IF ITEM
CORRELATION DELETED
Resp 1 .42 .75
Resp 2 .49 .73
Resp 3 .43 .74
Resp 4 .17 .80
Resp 5 .59 .72
Resp 6 .55 .73
Resp 7 .22 .76
Resp 8 .40 .75
Resp 9 .06 .78
Resp 10 .48 .74
Resp 11 .56 .73
Resp 12 .13 .77
Resp 13 .67 .72
Resp 14 .51 .73
STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .76 (14 items)
Note: Items deleted subsequently are underlined.
only negatively worded items in the scale. This was because of their low corrected item- 
total and low inter-item correlations (mean inter-item correlation of .18). These poor 
correlations were not altogether surprising, as it was difficult to devise negatively worded 
items for the complex concepts involved. Item 12 was also deleted because it too had a 
low corrected item-total and low inter-item correlations. However when Items 4, 7, 9, and 
12 were deleted the mean inter-item correlation increased to a satisfactory .35.
Thus 10 of the original 14 items were retained to form the final 
Responsibility Scale (see Appendix B). It was subsequently also administered in this final 
form to the clinical sample.
Final Responsibility Scale.
The final scale reliability was .84 for the 10 retained items. Thus the most 
important scale reliability criterion, internal consistency, was adequately met. 
Responsibility scores were obtained for each subject by adding each item score. Higher 
scores represented a greater degree of appraised responsibility in the respondent. The 
final mean scale score was 11.78 (SD = 7.24), and the score distribution was normal 
(skewness .66, kurtosis .15). The scores ranged from 0 to 35. The means and standard
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deviations for each of the 10 retained items are given in Appendix C. However 
researchers employing this scale, need to be aware that test-retest reliability was not 
established due to time constraints.
Factor Analyses.
Factor analyses were conducted on the 10 retained items. These were 
performed to provide an empirical summary or description of the pattern of correlations 
in the scale. It was also of interest, though not the prime goal of the scale development, to 
examine whether the items clustered in a way that reflected the five a priori conceptual 
areas. These "conceptual areas" were highly similar, so empirically distinct subscales were 
not predicted.
The items produced a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
of 0.79. Furthermore Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity produced highly significant results. This 
indicates there were substantial correlations between the items. They were, therefore, 
suitable for factor analysis. Two methods of factor extraction were used: Principal 
Components Analysis and Principal Axis Factoring.
However as the results using these two methods were very similar, the 
PCA solution was retained. Indeed, according to Velicer and Jackson (1990), such a 
result is not at all surprising. From their extensive review of the area they claim: "For 
most data sets, there will be no practical differences between the methods" (factor and 
component analysis) (p.110). Moreover, PCA operates on the crude assumption that 
there are no measurement errors for the items (hence all variance in an item is attributed 
to common variance). This assumption was appropriate in the current instance where an 
initial exploratory method of descriptive analysis was required in a relatively 
unformulated domain (D. Terry, personal communication, May 16, 1989).
Accordingly the responses for the items comprising the Responsibility 
Scale were intercorrelated and subjected to Principal Components Analysis and Varimax 
Rotation with initial communalities of one. Three factors were extracted and rotated 
using Kaiser’s criterion (factors with eigenvalues > 1 were rotated) and a significance 
level of 0.3 for the loadings on each factor was adopted (Childs, 1970). Final 
communalities, eigenvalues, and the percentage of variance accounted for by the rotated 
factors, are given in Table 2.
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Table 2.
Communalities. Eigenvalues, and Variance accounted for bv the Rotated (Varimax) Factors.
'EM COMMUNALITY * FACTOR EIGENVALUE %  VARIANCE
Resp 1 .79 * 1 4.20 42.0
Resp 2 .73 * 2 1.22 12.0
Resp 3 .54 * 3 1.03 10.3
Resp 4 .64 *
Resp 5 .65 * Total: 64.6
Resp 6 .79 *
Resp 7 .46 *
Resp 8 .68 *
Resp 9 .70 *
Resp 10 .48 *
The factors were then rotated by the oblique procedure, in part because of 
the extent of the factor correlations evident in the factor correlation matrix (see Table 3). 
Also it was anticipated this may achieve a more simple structure, given the highly 
correlated nature of the a priori concepts. In fact the factor solution obtained after 16 
iterations yielded a clustering of items that was highly similar to the varimax solution. 
Factor loadings of the items on the factors are given in Table 4. However scrutiny of the 
factor plots indicated a marginally improved solution over varimax, as there were fewer, 
though still four, remaining factorially complex items. Given the conceptual overlap in the 
a priori domains, this does not represent a difficulty.
Table 3.
Factor Correlation Matrix for the Responsibility Scale.
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
FACTOR 1 1.00
FACTOR 2 .31 1.00
FACTOR 3 .38 .15 1.00
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Table 4.
Pattern Matrix for the Items after Oblique Rotation
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
ITEM
Resp 4 .76
Resp 3 .75
Resp 9 .74
Resp 2 .73 -.40
Resp 6 .88
Resp 5 .48 .53
Resp 7 .31 .44
Resp 1 .92
Resp 8 .39 .66
Resp 10 .45
Note: Factor 1 is defined by items 4, 3, 9, 2. 
Factor 2 is defined by items 6, 5, 7.
Factor 3 is defined by items 1, 8, 10.
Interpretation of the Three Factors.
The three factors accounted for a significant 64.6% of the variance in the 
responses to the items. All three factors were interpretable, but highly similar as 
predicted. The first factor, onto which items 4, 3, 9, and 2 loaded significantly, seemed to 
be an overall measure of "Control": control over having had the thought (item 2), 
exercising control over the thought (items 4, 9), and the compulsion to act if in doubt 
(item 3). See Table 4 above.
Items 6, 5, and 7, loaded significantly onto the second factor. It pertained 
to a "Concern to Act to Prevent Harm". Thus Item 6 (failing to prevent is the same as 
causing harm), Item 5 (if in doubt, act to dispose of blame), and Item 7 (one can and 
should exercise control over thoughts) loaded onto this second factor.
The third factor seemed to encompass the belief of "Thought Leading to 
Action". Items 1 and 8 (the belief that harm results from thoughts), and Item 10 (if in 
doubt, act to clear of blame) loaded on the third factor. Hence the three interpreted 
factors were named "Control", "Concern to Act to Prevent Harm", and "Thought Leading 
to Action".
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In conclusion, the 10 item Responsibility Scale possesses adequate 
internal consistency, though its test-retest reliability is yet to be established. It had a mean 
value of 11.78 (SD = 7.24) and range of 0 to 35 for this normal sample. The scale also 
comprises items that can be grouped into three correlated factors. These three factors - 
Control, Concern to Act to Prevent Harm, and the Belief that Thoughts Lead to Action - 
encompass Salkovskis’ (1989b) five dysfunctional beliefs. To this extent it has met the 
initial requirements for establishing construct validity.
Predictors (cont.)
Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Psychoticism.
For both samples in the present study, extraversion and neuroticism were 
measured using the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (1975) (see Appendix A, pp. 1-2); 
psychoticism was measured using the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised 
(1985)(see Appendix A, pp.3-4).
The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised (Eysenck, Eysenck & 
Barrett) (1985), like the EPQ (1975), measures the three main dimensions of personality: 
neuroticism, extraversion, and psychoticism. It is the most recent development of the 
earlier Eysenckian personality Questionnaires: The Maudsley Medical Questionnaire 
(Eysenck, 1952), The Maudsley Personality Inventory (Eysenck, 1959), The Eysenck 
Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964), and the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975).
The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised (1985) is a self-report 
questionnaire comprised of 79 items: 23 extraversion items, 24 neuroticism items, and 32 
psychoticism items. It was created to improve the psychometric properties of the 
Psychoticism scale of the EPQ (1975). This was achieved by deleting six psychoticism 
items from the EPQ (1975) and adding 13 new ones to make a new total of 32 items. 
These 13 new psychoticism items seem, upon examination, to measure aspects of social 
responsibility and social sensitivity. For example, "Do you enjoy cooperating with 
others?", "Is it better to follow society’s rules than go your own way?"
Thus, for both samples in the present study, psychoticism was measured 
using the "P" scale of the EPQ-R (1985); the psychometric properties of which were 
clearly superior to the 1975 counterpart. However the EPQ (1975) was employed to 
measure extraversion and neuroticism. This was because this measure was already being
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used by the St. Vincent’s Anxiety Disorders Clinic in Sydney. Also Eysenck, Eysenck, and 
Barrett (1985) did not claim that the addition of the one neuroticism and two 
extraversion items to the revised scales altered their content validity. A further 
consideration was the potential inconvenience and confusion for clinical subjects if two 
similar versions of "E" and "N" were administered. Hence the EPQ (1975) was retained to 
measure extraversion and neuroticism.
Extraversion - Introversion
Extraversion-Introversion was measured using the 21 item "E" subscale of 
the EPQ (1975). According to Eysenck, Eysenck, and Barrett (1985) the 1985 and 1975 
versions of the "E" scale comprise largely sociability and activity items only. For example, 
"Do you enjoy meeting new people?", "Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself 
at a lively party?" Respondents answer by circling a "Yes" or a "No" following each 
question. An extraversion score is obtained for each subject by adding all the "Yes" 
responses; "No" responses are added for the three reverse scored items. Higher scores 
indicate an increasing degree of extraversion, sociability, or activity and lower scores, an 
increasing degree of introversion or introspection and non-sociability.
Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) reported an adequate test-retest reliability 
for extraversion of .90 for male and .87 for female adult (normal) samples. There was one 
month intervening between the testings. Adequate internal consistencies of .85 for male 
and .84 for females were also reported (pp.16-17). In the present study the internal 
consistency of the Extraversion scale for the normal sample of 151 was a comparable .89.
Neuroticism - Stability.
Neuroticism-Stability was measured using the 21 item "N" subscale of the 
EPQ (1975). As for the Extraversion subscale respondents answer by circling a "Yes" or 
"No" following each question. However no "neuroticism" items are reverse scored. 
Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) described the typical high N scorer as being an over- 
emotional person; one who is "anxious, a worrier, moody, and frequently depressed" (p.9). 
The low "N" scorer is emotionally stable or "calm, even-tempered, controlled, and 
unworried" (p.10). Typical items include, "Do you often worry about things you should not 
have done or said?", "Does your mood often go up and down?"
A test-retest reliability for neuroticism of .89 for male and .80 for female 
normal samples was reported by Eysenck and Eysenck (1975). They reported internal
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consistency reliabilities of .84 for male and .85 for female normal samples (pp. 16-17). In 
the present study a comparable internal consistency of .86 was found for the normal 
sample of 151 subjects.
Validity o f Extraversion and Neuroticism Scales.
S. B. G. Eysenck and H. J. Eysenck (1963) claimed adequate validity for 
the Neuroticism and Extraversion scales. This was on the basis of repeated findings that 
independent judges classified subjects in a way comparable to how the subjects classified 
themselves by their responses to the "N" and "E" items in the EPI (Eysenck & Eysenck, 
1964).
However some researchers have questioned the validity of the 
Neuroticism scale. For example Braithwaite (1987) claimed that "A considerable 
proportion of the items in the N scale refer not to emotionality per se, but to unpleasant 
experiences that are contingent upon being emotionally aroused" (p.218). However the 
Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) measure of neuroticism was used to enable comparison of 
results with those of previous studies. The Extraversion scale was employed for the same 
reason, despite a reportedly growing interest in developing measures of "impulsivity" or 
"sensation seeking" in its stead (Zuckermann et al., 1988). Moreover, these studies are 
still preliminary and lack adequate rigour.
Psychoticism - Tender-mindedness.
According to Eysenck, Eysenck, and Barrett (1985) the 32 item 
Psychoticism scale of the EPQ-R (1985) is a measure of "hostility, cruelty, lack of 
empathy, and non conformism; that is, it taps several different facets" (p.25). Typical 
items include, "Do you enjoy hurting people you love?", "Do you prefer to go your own 
way rather than act by the rules?" As for extraversion and neuroticism, respondents circle 
a "Yes" or a "No" to each item. Nineteen items are reverse scored. A psychoticism score is 
obtained using the same procedure as for "N" and "E" scores. Low scores measure 
responsibility, maturity, and social conformism; the opposite traits to those measured by 
high scores (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976).
The psychoticism dimension is the most recently conceptualized and 
measured of the three Eysenckian personality constructs. It is also the most controversial. 
Although, the numerous criticisms of the psychometric properties of the original
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Psychoticism scale (EPQ) (1975) by Bishop (1977), for example, have been substantially 
addressed by the revised scale (EPQ-R) (Eysenck, Eysenck & Barrett, 1985).
These defects included the low internal reliability of .74 for males and .68 
for females. In the revised scale (EPQ-R) (1985) these were increased slightly for males 
(.78) and moderately for females (.76). In addition the original P scale had a low range of 
scoring, with means of 3.78 (SD = 3.09) for males and 2.63 (SD = 2.36) for females. These 
increased substantially to a mean of 7.19 (S£> = 4.6) for males and 5.73 (SD = 3.85) for 
females. The original scores also had distributions displaying considerable skewness (1.35 
for males and 1.55 for females), and kurtosis (2.65 for males and 4.16 for females). The 
revised scale had more acceptable, though mildly defective, skewness values of 1.02 for 
males and .90 for females. Similarly the kurtosis of the revised scale was 1.49 for males 
and 1.27 for females.
In the present study the internal consistency of the Psychoticism scale for 
the normal sample of 151 was .71. This was slightly lower than the values of .78 (males) 
and .76 (females) reported by Eysenck, Eysenck, and Barrett (1985).
Validity o f the Psychoticism Scale
Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) cite evidence that psychotics, both male and 
female, have higher P scores than do normal or neurotic subjects. This satisfies one 
method of validation - the testing of criterion groups. They also cite studies which 
demonstrate a relation between P and anti-social behaviour (e.g., Eysenck, 1971; Eysenck, 
1973). Further, standardization data indicate that men have higher P scores than women. 
Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) suggest this may be due to differing levels of aggression and 
hostility in the sexes.
Thus psychoticism, as measured in the 1975 version of the EPQ, seems to 
discriminate subjects who are psychotic and (or) antisocial and (or) aggressive and hostile 
(male) from those who are normal and (or) socially responsible and (or) calm and 
accepting (female).
Torrubia and Muntaner (1987) demonstrated that "The Revised 
Psychoticism scale ... does not differ greatly from its predecessor in its relationship to 
other personality variables." To this extent the validity of the 1985 revised P scale has 
been established (p.261).
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The Beck Depression Inventory.
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) 
is a 21 item measure of intensity of self-reported depression pertaining to "the past week 
and including today" (p.398). (See Appendix A, pp. 10-12). It was derived from clinical 
observations about the attitudes and symptoms displayed frequently by depressed, and 
infrequently by nondepressed, psychiatric patients (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & 
Erbaugh, 1961). These clinical observations were reduced to 21 categories (e.g., 
pessimism, self-doubt, appetite loss). Each of these contains a graduated series of four 
different statements which describe the severity of the particular depressive symptom or 
attitude. The respondent is asked to rate the intensity of each item on a scale from 0 to 3. 
It is scored by summing the ratings given to each of the 21 items. A high score on the BDI 
represents more severe depression - the range of possible scores is 0 to 63. Beck and 
Beamesderfer (1974) recommended the following guidelines for BDI cut-off scores with 
patients diagnosed as having an affective disorder: none or minimal depression if less 
than 10, mild to moderate depression if 10-18, moderate to severe depression if 19-29, 
and severe depression if 30-63.
Reliability
According to Beck, Steer, and Garbin (1988) the BDI has high internal 
consistency in both psychiatric and non-psychiatric samples. From their review of BDI 
studies over 25 years, they estimated a mean internal consistency coefficient of .86 for 
psychiatric patients and .81 for nonpsychiatric subjects. This was comparable to the 
coefficient alpha of .89 for the normal sample of 151 in this study. Beck et al. (1988) 
reported an estimated test-retest reliability of greater than .60 for both types of samples.
Validity.
Beck et al. (1988) claimed the BDI possesses high concurrent and 
criterion validity. They consider that its concurrent validity with respect to other 
measures of depression has been more than adequately demonstrated for clinical and 
non-clinical samples.
First, they claim the BDI is related to clinical assessments of depression 
(.72 and .60 for psychiatric patients and nonpsychiatric subjects respectively). Secondly 
the BDI has significant positive relationships with four well-researched measures of 
depression. These pertain to psychiatric and nonpsychiatric samples respectively: the
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Hamilton Psychiatric Rating Scale for Depression (Hamilton, 1960), (.73 and .77); the 
Zung Self-reported Depression scale (Zung, 1965), (.76 and .71); the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory Depression Scale (Hathaway, & McKinley, 1943), (.76 
and .60); and the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist Depression Scale (Zuckermann & 
Lubin, 1965), (.63 and .63).
Beck et al. (1988) also claim there is evidence that the BDI differentiates 
psychiatric and nonpsychiatric patients; medical patients, nonmedical patients, and 
normals; as well as subtypes of depression.
Nonetheless Beck et al. (1988) caution that the correlations of the BDI 
with other symptom measures in nonclinical subjects are "sufficiently high to warrant 
caution in interpreting findings as indicative of depression in such populations" (p.78). 
However the mean BDI score for the normal sample in the present study was 8.61 
(SX> = 7.87), indicative of either no depression or minimal depression. Tanaka-Matsumi 
and Kameoka (1986) and Lightfoot and Oliver (1985) reported similar mean BDI scores 
of 7.9 (SD = 6.7) and 7.28 (SD = 6.89) for their American samples of college and 
undergraduate University students respectively.
By contrast the mean BDI score for the clinical sample in this study was at 
the low end of the moderate to severe depression range of 19-29. According to Beck et al. 
(1988) such a finding for a clinical sample does not raise questions of interpretation.
In conclusion, the BDI possesses adequate psychometric properties for 
psychiatric and nonpsychiatric samples. A possible exception to this is that, when scores 
for nonpsychiatric samples are high, caution should be taken in interpretation. However 
this was not pertinent for the normal sample in this study.
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RESULTS
THE NORMAL SAMPLE.
Data Screening.
Prior to analysis all variables were examined through various SPSS 
programs for accuracy of data entry, missing values, and fit between their distributions 
and the assumptions of multivariate analysis. Three cases were deleted because each 
included at least five missing values on the neuroticism and extraversion scales. In 
addition exploratory checks for the effects of multivariate outliers revealed one outlier 
with a large standardized residual of 5. On inspection it was evident that this case had 
score combinations that were exceptions to the overall pattern of correlations for this 
sample. Accordingly it was deleted. Hence after the deletion of four cases, 151 were 
retained for analysis.
Also attempts were made to reduce the extreme skewness and kurtosis of 
the variable age. This was unsuccessful with both logarithmic and inverse transformations. 
(The nonnormality of the age variable was not surprising, given that the sample 
comprised first year Psychology students). In addition as the variables "severity of 
obsessions and compulsions" (Padua Inventory) and depression had mild skewness and 
kurtosis, a square root transformation was used. However the subsequent patterns of 
correlations were almost identical to those yielded for the untransformed variables. 
Therefore, in order to preserve clarity of interpretation, only results based on 
untransformed variables are reported.
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DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS.
The Criterion: Severity of Self-reported Disturbance due to Obsessive Thoughts and 
Compulsive Behaviours (Obsessive-Compulsive Behaviour).
Total Scale Scores on the Padua Inventory.
In the normal sample the mean Padua Inventory (PI) score was 31.53 
(SD = 21.54): a score lower than that reported by Sanavio (1988) and Sternberger and 
Burns (1990), but higher than that reported by Crino (R. D. Crino, personal 
communication, 25 April, 1991). See Table 5. This inconsistency in reported
Table 5.
Behaviours (Normal Samples. Mean Padua Scores').
Study n M SD.
Sanavio (1988) 967 57.76 28.41
489 53.13 (male) 27.46
478 62.38 (female) 29.36
Sternberger and 678 41.33 25.77
Burns (1990)
Crino (1991) 51 21.78 23.48
The present study 151 31.53 21.54
means could be due to age, sex, and cultural differences in the four studies cited. Sanavio 
(1988) studied a large Italian sample of 967 males and females, finding that females (on 
average) had higher PI scores than males. Furthermore females in his 16 to 20 age group 
had the highest mean for any of his age groups (range 16-70 years). By contrast 
Sternberger and Burns (1990) reported no sex effects for their sample of 19 year old 
American college students ( N -  678). Finally the only reported Australian PI norms are 
those of Crino for a sample of 79 middle-aged residents of Maroubra, Sydney 
(R. D. Crino, personal communication, April 25, 1991). Thus comparison of the mean PI 
score in the present study of young Australian University students is made difficult by the 
heterogeneous nature of the samples in the few reported studies of the Padua Inventory.
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Subscale Scores on the Padua Inventory.
The four subscale scores of the PI were calculated for each subject 
according to the recommendations of Sanavio (1988). The means and standard deviations 
for each subscale in this and Sternberger and Burns (1990) study can be found in Table 6.
Table 6.
Mean Subscale Scores on the Padua Inventory (Normal Samples).
Subscale n M SD
Impaired Control 151 11.57 8.99
of Mental Activities (678)* (13.35) (9.51)
Becoming 151 5.31 4.76
Contaminated (678) (8.26) (5.66)
Checking 151 5.10 4.87
(678) (6.59) (5.61)
Urges and Worries 151 2.20 3.23
of Losing Control (678) (3.00) (3.76)
over Motor Behaviours
* Note: The Results of Stemberger and Bums (1990) are in brackets.
Sanavio (1988) did not report his subscale means. The four Padua Inventory subscales 
comprised 17, 11, 8, and 7 items respectively. As inspection of Table 6 indicates, the four 
mean subscale scores for the normal sample in this study were consistently lower than 
those of Sternberger and Burns’ (1990) American college students, though this was not to 
a significant extent.
Age and Sex effects on the Padua
As age and sex effects on the Padua were reported by Sanavio (1988) they 
were investigated for this sample. Such an analysis found no significant difference 
between the female (A/=32.03, 579 = 21.75) and male (A/=30.60, 579 = 21.32) mean scores 
on the Padua Inventory, F(l,147) = 0, p<.99. However a significant effect was found for 
age when the sample was divided into two groups: those less than or equal to 20 years, 
and those older than 20. The younger age group yielded a significantly higher Padua score 
(A/=33.68; 579 = 21.89) than the older group (M =22.87; 579= 17.89), F(l,147) = 6.1,p<.02. 
However, the Age X Sex interaction was nonsignificant (F(l,147) = .71,p<.4). Additional
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age groupings were attempted but did not permit analyses due to insufficient numbers in 
the groups.
The age effect found in the present study was consistent with Sanavio’s 
(1988) finding of higher PI scores for younger subjects. Hence the need to control for age. 
Further, the absence of a sex effect was consistent with Sternberger and Burns (1990) 
results, but contrary to Sanavio’s (1988) findings of higher PI scores for females. Because 
their results were equivocal, sex was also controlled in the present study.
Mean Values of the Predictor Variables.
The means and standard deviations of the predictor variables of interest - 
neuroticism, extraversion, psychoticism, responsibility, and depression were calculated. 
They were comparable to those of previous studies for normal samples of similar age and 
both sexes (see Table 7). Clearly this normal sample is not atypical for the predictor 
variables measured.
Table 7.
Means and Standard Deviations of Predictor Variables (N=  151) (Normal Sample).
Variable Mean SD Range
Neuroticism 10.84 5.52 0-23
(11.34)* (5.04)
Extraversion 13.90 5.28 0-21
(13.31)* (4.75)
Psychoticism 6.82 3.90 0-17
(7.43)** (4.21)
Responsibility 11.65 7.09 0-35
Depression 8.61 7.87 0-38
(7.28)# (6.89)
Note: The means and standard deviations in brackets are normative values for the 20-29 age 
group and both sexes. Values are from the following sources:
* (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). Nomtal sample.
** (Eysenck, Eysenck & Barrett, 1985). Nonrial sample.
#(Lightfoot & Oliver, 1985). Undergraduate students.
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Correlations between the Criterion and Predictor Variables.
The predictors neuroticism, depression, and responsibility yielded 
significant positive zero-order correlations such that increases in these variables 
corresponded with increases in "obsessive-compulsive behaviour" (see Table 8). By 
contrast the variable age was significantly negatively correlated with the criterion: as age 
increased obsessive-compulsive behaviour decreased. These significant results were 
consistent with the first hypothesis, as were the directions of the respective correlations. 
Moreover the first three mentioned variables were also significantly positively correlated 
with each of the four Padua Inventory subscales. Age however had significant and 
negative correlations with only two of the PI subscales: FI (Impaired Control of Mental 
Activities) and F3 (Checking).
Table 8.
Correlation Matrix of the Criterion and Predictor Variables (/V = 151) (Normal Sample).
Criterion
Neur. Ext.
Predictors. 
Psy. Resp. Age Sex Dep.
Padua .52** -.10 -.05 .50** -.24** .03 .51**
FI .59** -.20 -.03 .49** -.20** .03 .55**
F2 .23** .09 -.17* .31** -.15 .12 .18*
F3 .30** .02 -.12 .39** -.18* -.02 .30**
F4 .23** -.14 .27** .22** -.15 -.11 .33**
*p<.05;** p< .01 (significance of Beta coefficients tested using two-tailed tests). 
Neur. = Neuroticism, Ext. = Extraversion, Psy. = Psychoticism,
Resp. = Responsibility, Dep. = Depression.
FI. = Impaired Control of Mental Activities.
F2. = Becoming Contaminated.
F3. = Checking.
F4. = Urges and Worries of Losing Control over Motor Behaviours
Contrary to the first hypothesis extraversion, psychoticism, and sex were 
not significantly correlated with the Padua Inventory. Extraversion only had a significant 
negative correlation with the first Padua subscale FI such that more introverted subjects 
reported greater severity of "Impaired Control of Mental Activities" (see Table 8). 
However for this sample introversion was not related to the Padua Inventory measure of 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour.
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Psychoticism was also not significantly correlated with obsessive- 
compulsive behaviour. Yet psychoticism had a significant negative correlation with the 
second Padua subscale, F2. Thus increases in responsibility, empathy, and social 
conformism were correlated with increases in severity of fears of "Becoming 
Contaminated". In addition psychoticism had a significant positive correlation with the 
fourth subscale F4, such that increases in hostility, cruelty, lack of empathy, and non 
conformism were correlated with "Urges and Worries of Losing Control over Motor 
Behaviours." These opposing correlations indicate that psychoticism does not have a clear 
relationship to obsessive-compulsive behaviour as measured by the Padua Inventory. 
Finally, a sex effect was not found suggesting the contrary finding in Sanavio’s (1988) 
study could be attributed to age and cultural differences in the two samples.
Hence at the bivariate level there was some support for the first 
hypothesis, namely that
(HI). Scores on the Padua Inventory will be positively correlated with neuroticism, 
responsibility, depression, and the female sex, but negatively correlated with 
extraversion, psychoticism, and age.
Thus far neuroticism and responsibility (variables of interest) and 
depression (control variable) have emerged as moderately significant variables in relation 
to obsessive-compulsive behaviour; age is a less significant control variable; while 
extraversion, psychoticism, and sex are not significant.
Intercorrelations among the Predictor Variables.
There was no evidence of multicollinearity among the predictors as 
revealed by inspection of Table 9. In all instances the scale intercorrelations were at least 
.20 below the mean scale reliability.
However there was evidence of significant overlap between these 
variables. Three of the four predictors with significant zero order correlations with the 
Padua Inventory were significantly inter-correlated - neuroticism, depression, and 
responsibility - such that increases in one variable corresponded with increases in the 
remaining two variables (see Table 9). In addition the three control variables were all 
significantly correlated with responsibility: depression to a moderate degree, and age and 
sex to a lesser degree.
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Table 9.
Intercorrelations among Predictor Variables (jV=151)(Normal Sample).
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Age
2. Sex -.02
3. Dep -.12 .11 (.89)
4. Neur -.04 .13 .57** (.86)
5. Ext -.15 .11 -.26** -.37** (.89)
6. Psy -.10 -.26** .04 -.17* .18* (.71)
7. Resp -.17* .17* .32** .22** -.12 -.26** (.84)
Note: Reliabilities (Cronbach's, 1951, alpha coefficient) in parentheses along main diagonal. 
*p<.05; **p<.01 (significance of Beta coefficients tested using two-tailed tests).
Dep. =  Depression, Neun =  Neuroticism, Ext. = Extraversion, Psy. = Psychoticism, Resp. = 
Responsibility.
Of particular interest were the findings that even though responsibility was 
related to neuroticism and depression, it was not related to introversion (though 
neuroticism, depression, and introversion were related). Also, though psychoticism was 
not related to the criterion, it was inversely related to responsibility such that increases in 
responsibility were related to decreases in psychoticism.
Thus the new variable responsibility was correlated with all the other 
predictor variables (except introversion) as well as with the three control variables. Also 
though there was considerable overlap between the significant predictor variables this was 
not to the extent of producing multicollinearity.
In the following section hierarchical regression analyses will be used to 
investigate the unique contribution of the variables in predicting the criterion.
Regression Analyses.
Separate hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to test the 
second, third, and fourth hypotheses. In these analyses the demographic variables age and 
sex were controlled by entering them first into the regression equations. Depression, an 
"individual difference variable", was also controlled by entering it at the second step. This 
procedure permitted an investigation of the extent to which the variables of interest
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accounted for additional variability in obsessive-compulsive behaviour, over and above 
that accounted for by age, sex, and depression.
The second hypothesis was that
H(2) Differences in neuroticism and extraversion have added explanatory power in 
the prediction o f obsessive-compulsive behaviour, beyond that afforded by differences 
in age, sex, and depression.
Results obtained from testing the second hypothesis are reported in 
Table 10. Inspection of this table reveals that age and sex accounted for a small but 
significant 6% (Adj.R^ = A%) of the variance in obsessive-compulsive behaviour. At the 
second step depression added a significant 23% to the variance explained. Considered 
together, the three control variables accounted for 29% (Adj.R? = 28%) of criterion 
variance. At the third step, neuroticism and extraversion accounted for an additional 10% 
of the variability in obsessive-compulsive behaviour.
Table 10.
Hierarchical Multiple Regression of "Degree of disturbance due to Obsessions and 
Compulsions" on Age. Sex. Depression: Neuroticism and Extraversion (Hypothesis 2).
Predictor R Adj.R2 R2 ch. F Final Beta
Age -.17**
Sex .06 .04 .06 4.42** -.07
Depression .29 .28 .23 20.29** .30**
Neuroticism .39**
Extraversion .39 .36 .10 18.19** .10
**p<.01 (significance of Beta coefficients tested using two-tailed tests).
At the final step the important unique predictors were neuroticism, 
depression, and age. Neuroticism was the most important predictor (Beta = .39, pc.OO), 
depression the second most important (Beta = .30, /?<.00), and age the least important 
(Beta = -.17,/?<.00) predictor of the criterion. However consistent with its nonsignificant 
zero-order correlation, extraversion did not make a significant contribution in its own 
right (Beta = .10, p<. 17). Yet there was some evidence of a mild suppressor effect for 
extraversion. Further the Beta weight of neuroticism (.39) was considerably lower than its
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zero-order correlation of .52, reflecting its significant correlation with depression. This 
analysis also identifies depression as an important control variable as it explains a 
significant 23% of the variance in severity of obsessive-compulsive behaviour.
Thus the second hypothesis was generally supported as age, sex, 
depression, neuroticism, and extraversion accounted for 39% (Adj.R? = 36%) of the 
variance in "degree of disturbance due to obsessions and compulsions". Moreover after 
age, sex, and depression were controlled neuroticism and extraversion accounted for a 
unique 10% of the variance with the contribution being predominantly from neuroticism.
The third hypothesis was that
(H3) Differences in psychoticism have added explanatory power in the prediction of 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour over that o f neuroticism and extraversion, and 
beyond that afforded by differences in age, sex, and depression.
The third hypothesis was also tested using hierarchical multiple 
regression. The results obtained when psychoticism was added to the model are 
presented in Table 11. Thus the inclusion of extraversion, neuroticism, and
Table 11.
Hierarchical Multiple Regression of "Degree of disturbance due to Obsessions and 
Compulsions" on Age. Sex, Depression: Neuroticism. Extraversion, and Psychoticism 
(Hypothesis 3).
Predictor R2 Adj.R2 R2 ch. F Final Beta
Age -.18**
Sex .06 .04 .06 4.42** -.08
Depression .29 .28 .23 20.29** .31**
Neuroticism .38**
Extraversion .11
Psychoticism .39 .36 .10 15.21** -.05
**p<.01 (significance of Beta coefficients tested using two-tailed tests).
psychoticism added significantly to the prediction of obsessive-compulsive behaviour. 
However psychoticism added nothing to the unique contribution of 10% made by 
extraversion and neuroticism in the second analysis. This was expected as psychoticism,
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like extraversion, did not have a significant zero-order correlation with obsessive- 
compulsive behaviour. There was again some evidence of a mild suppressor effect for 
extraversion. Moreover, neuroticism emerged again as the most significant predictor 
(Beta = .38,p<.00), with depression second in importance (Beta = .31,/?<.00), and age the 
least important significant predictor (Beta = -.18, p< .00). In the final equation the 
variables age, sex, depression, neuroticism, extraversion, and psychoticism accounted for 
39% (Adj.R^ = 36%) of the variance, the same as for the variables in the second analysis.
The third hypothesis was therefore disconfirmed because neuroticism, 
extraversion, and psychoticism accounted for no additional unique variance over and 
above that accounted for by neuroticism and extraversion.
Finally, and very significantly, inspection of Table 12 reveals that the 
fourth and most important hypothesis in this study was supported. The fourth hypothesis 
was that
(H4) Differences in responsibility have added explanatory power in the prediction of 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour over that of neuroticism, extraversion, and 
psychoticism and beyond that afforded by differences in age, sex, and depression.
When responsibility was added to neuroticism, extraversion, and 
psychoticism at the fourth step it added a significant 11% of unique variance over and 
above that contributed by the Eysenckian dimensions. In the final equation neuroticism 
persisted as the most significant predictor (Beta = .39, p<.00) with responsibility now 
second in importance (Beta = .37, pc.OO), and depression third (Beta = .20, p< .00). 
Extraversion, age, and sex were not significant though there was some evidence of a mild 
suppressor effect for extraversion. Moreover in the final equation the variables age, sex, 
depression, neuroticism, extraversion, psychoticism, and responsibility accounted for a 
considerable 50% (Adj.R^ = 47%) of the variance in severity of obsessions and 
compulsions.
These results suggest that neuroticism and responsibility are measuring 
something over and above depression in the explanation of severity of obsessions and 
compulsions. They also indicate that the demographic variables age and sex are less 
important in the prediction of obsessions and compulsions.
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Table 12.
Compulsions" on Aee. Sex. Deoression: Neuroticism. Extraversion Psychoticism and
Responsibilitv (Hypothesis 4).
Predictor R=2 Adj.R2 R2 ch. F Final Beta
Age -.12
Sex .06 .04 .06 4.41** -.11
Depression .29 .28 .23 20.29** .20**
Neuroticism .39**
Extraversion .12
Psychoticism .39 .36 .10 15.21** .04
Responsibility .50 .47 .11 20.32** .37**
*p<.05; **p<.01 (significance of Beta coefficients tested using two-tailed tests).
In conclusion, for this normal sample the individual difference variables 
neuroticism and responsibility were significant predictors of "degree of disturbance due to 
obsessions and compulsions", as measured by the Padua Inventory. This persists even 
when their shared variance with depression is controlled, and when the demographic 
variables are also controlled. By contrast extraversion and psychoticism were not 
predictors of the criterion. However though psychoticism is not related to the criterion, 
decreases in psychoticism are significantly related to increases in responsibility. This is 
consistent with the fourth hypothesis which proposes that one particular aspect of 
psychoticism, responsibility, is the potent predictor of obsessive-compulsive behaviour.
THE CLINICAL SAMPLE.
The Criterion: Severity of Self-reported Disturbance due to Obsessive Thoughts and 
Compulsive Behaviours.
Total Scale Scores on the Padua Inventory
The mean Padua Inventory score was 82.95 (SD = 36.84) for the sample of 
20 subjects diagnosed as OCD according to DSM 111-R (1987) criteria. The range of PI 
scores was 14-156. The mean PI for males was 93.44 (n = 9), and for females 74.36 (n = 11). 
Though the male scores were higher than the female, there was no significant difference
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between them for this small sample F(l,16)= 1.19, p<.29. For his clinical sample of 35 
male and 40 female obsessive-compulsives Sanavio (1988) reported the following mean 
Padua Inventory scores: 83.6 (5D = 34.8) for males and 98.6 (SD = 32.3) for females. Thus 
in Sanavio’s samples females scored higher on the PI than males, though not to a 
significant degree. Accordingly it seems the mean Padua Inventory scores for this small 
pilot Australian sample are generally comparable to those reported by Sanavio (1988) for 
his Italian sample.
Mean values of the Predictor Variables.
The means and standard deviations of the predictor variables of interest - 
neuroticism, extraversion, psychoticism, depression, and responsibility - were calculated 
(see Table 13). As anticipated the clinical sample was more neurotic, introverted, 
depressed (moderate in contrast to minimal), and responsible but less psychotic than the 
normal sample.
Table 13.
Means and Standard Deviations of Predictor Variables (jV=20) (Clinical Sample)
Variable Mean SD Range.
Neuroticism 17.65 3.60 11-23
Extraversion 9.15 5.38 1-18
Psychoticism 4.95 3.75 0-12
Responsibility 23.00 12.17 4-37
Depression 20.45 8.74 6-37
Correlations between the Criterion and Predictor Variables.
As in the normal sample the predictors neuroticism, depression, and 
responsibility yielded significant positive zero-order correlations with the total Padua 
score such that increases in these variables corresponded with increases in PI scores (see 
Table 14). Neuroticism was also significantly positively correlated with two of the four 
Padua subscales, FI and F4. That is increases in neuroticism were associated with 
increases in "Impaired Control of Mental Activities", and increases in "Urges and Worries 
of Losing Control over Motor Behaviours". Or increases in neuroticism seemed to be 
related to increased fear of, or actual loss of control over, both thoughts and behaviours.
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Table 14.
Correlation Matrix of the Criterion and Predictor Variables ( N=20) (Clinical Sample).
Criterion Predictors.
Neur. Ext. Psy. Resp. Age Sex Dep.
Padua .60** -.07 .27 .48* .06 -.26 .56**
FI .61** .05 .13 .31 -.10 -.09 .60**
F2 -.02 -.30 .09 .31 .00 -.23 .22
F3 .30 -.06 .13 .32 .22 -.40 -.04
F4 .53** .01 .16 .34 .25 .10 .39
*p<.05;**p<.01 (significance of Beta coefficients tested using two-tailed tests).
Neun = Neuroticism, Ext. = Extraversion, Psy.= Psychoticism, Resp. = Responsibility, 
Dep. = Depression.
FI. = Impaired Control of Mental Activities.
F2. = Becoming Contaminated.
F3. = Checking.
F4. = Urges and Worries of Losing Control over Motor Behaviours.
Depression was the only other predictor variable which had a significant correlation with 
a Padua subscale. Increases in depression were associated with increases in "Impaired 
Control of Mental Activities" (FI).
Thus, as for the normal sample, neuroticism, depression, and 
responsibility were the variables with significant zero-order correlations. In addition the 
rank ordering and moderate degree of the correlations was the same as that for the 
normal sample. It is, further, evident that the importance of responsibility in the normal 
sample is not unique to such a sample. Clearly responsibility is also important in the 
clinical sample.
Intercorrelations among the Predictor Variables.
There was no evidence of multicollinearity among the predictors as 
revealed by inspection of Table 15. In all instances the scale intercorrelations were at 
least .20 below the mean scale reliability. However there was evidence of significant 
overlap between the variables neuroticism, depression, and responsibility. Thus the three 
variables with significant zero-order correlations were significantly inter-correlated, such 
that increases in one variable corresponded with increases in the other two.
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Table 15.
Intercorrelations among Predictor Variables (N= 20)(Clinical Sample)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Age
2. Sex -.11
3. Dep -.15 .02
4. Neur .06 -.03 .61**
5. Ext .20 .20 -.03 .00
6. Psy -.29 -.23 .06 .00 .13
7. Resp -.01 -.06 .10 .55** .01 .10
Note: Reliabilities (Cronbach's, 1951, alpha coefficient) in parentheses along main diagonal. 
*p<.05; **p<.01 (significance of Beta coefficients tested using two-tailed tests).
Dep.= Depression, Neur. = Neuroticism, Ext. = Extraversion, Psy. = Psychoticism,
Resp. = Responsibility.
SUMMARY.
In summary, this small pilot clinical sample provides preliminary support 
for the assumption in this and the majority of OCD studies since 1970, that there is a 
continuum between normal and clinical OCD subjects. However this study proposes that 
the continuum is with respect to increases in the individual difference measures of 
neuroticism, depression, and responsibility and corresponding increases in severity of 
obsessions and compulsions. As expected the mean values of these four variables are 
higher in the clinical group. Their similar patterns of correlations suggest, however, that 
they work together in the same way, whether the sample is normal or clinical.
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DISCUSSION
The present study found that, for the normal sample, age and sex 
accounted for 6% (AdjR^ = 4%) of the variance in obsessive-compulsive behaviour. 
Depression explained an additional 23% of variance increasing the variability explained 
by controls to 29% (AdjR^ = 28%). However the Eysenckian dimensions neuroticism, 
extraversion, and psychoticism added a further 10% over and above that contributed by 
the control variables. The addition of responsibility contributed a further unique 11% to 
criterion prediction. Moreover, at the final step, all the variables accounted for 50% 
(AdjR? = 48%) of the variability in obsessive-compulsive behaviour. Neuroticism, 
responsibility, and depression were therefore the significant predictors with extraversion, 
psychoticism, age, and sex unimportant in obsessive-compulsive behaviour.
Taken together these results demonstrate the utility of H. J. and 
M. W. Eysencks’ (1985) step-wise approach to building more powerful predictive 
behavioural equations; investigate the contribution of the Eysenckian factors, then 
attempt to explain more variance by entering those traits implicated by research into the 
particular behaviour of interest.
Moreover the same pattern of correlations persisted in the pilot clinical 
sample. Most importantly this suggests the variable proposed by Salkovskis (1985, 1989a, 
1989b), "exaggerated beliefs about responsibility for behaviour", is relevant to both 
clinical and normal populations. It is also consistent with the assumption that obsessive- 
compulsive behaviour can legitimately be studied using large normal samples. Thus the 
present study has demonstrated for a normal sample of Australian University 
undergraduates that the more neurotic, responsible, and depressed a person is the more 
disturbing is their experience of obsessions and compulsions likely to be. Furthermore 
these same individual difference measures were central in the pilot clinical sample.
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THE PRESENT RESULTS: RELATION TO PREVIOUS RESEARCH.
Neuroticism and Introversion.
Previous studies have typically implicated both neuroticism and 
introversion as important correlates of obsessions and compulsions. However the present 
study found that increases in neuroticism were associated with increases in obsessive- 
compulsive behaviour, whereas introversion was not an important predictor. This accords 
with Sanavio’s (1988), but not the majority of previous research findings.
Neuroticism, Introversion and the Cortical Arousal Theory.
If one applies cortical arousal theory to the present results, increases in 
limbic arousal or activation (neuroticism) will be associated with increases in obsessive- 
compulsive behaviour. Thus those with unstable emotional personalities will be more 
likely to experience obsessional thoughts and compulsive behaviours which they find 
disturbing. However increases in cortical arousal (introversion) will only be associated 
with some types of obsessions namely "Impaired Control of Mental Activities" and not 
with compulsions. Thus those with higher cortical arousal will be more likely to have 
"Impaired Control of Mental Activities". They will not necessarily have "Urges and 
Worries of Losing Control over Motor Behaviours", nor contamination or checking 
compulsions. An explanation of this result requires specific research into the cortical 
arousal theory and OCD. Nevertheless, the present results suggest emotional arousal 
rather than cortical arousal is critical in the experience of both obsessions and 
compulsions.
Neuroticism.
The importance of neuroticism in obsessions and compulsions can also be 
explained in terms of its various traits such as depression, anxiety, guilt feelings, low self 
esteem, tension, irrationality, shyness, moodiness, and emotionality. Of these depression 
has most consistently been found to be important in obsessions and compulsions. 
Nonetheless in the present study the variable neuroticism made the most significant 
contribution, even when the effects of depression were controlled. Anxiety and guilt have 
also been studied, but less frequently than depression.
There are few reported studies of anxiety, obsessions, and compulsions. 
Moreover anti-anxiety drugs have not had the reported success of certain anti-
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depressants such as Clomipramine, Fluoxetine, and Fluvoxamine (Jenike, 1990). Most 
typically anxiety has been described as the conditioned response to obsessions which is 
then alleviated by compulsive behaviours. Salkovskis and colleagues however have 
recently proposed a more refined and specific role for anxiety as part of an explanatory 
model for the development of obsessions and compulsions.
Dent and Salkovskis (1986) employed the Beck Anxiety Checklist (Beck, 
Brown & Steer, 1986) and the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (Hodgson & 
Rachman, 1977). Also Reynolds and Salkovskis (1991) used the Beck Anxiety Inventory 
(Beck, Epstein, Brown et al., 1988) and an Intrusive Thoughts Questionnaire adapted 
from that used by Salkovskis and Harrison (1984). On the basis of these studies 
Salkovskis (1985, 1989a, 1989b) hypothesized that depression and anxiety affect the 
appraisal of a situation which may result in the individual over-assuming responsibility. 
This may, in turn, have an adverse effect on mood, with the negative mood increasing the 
likelihood of further negative intrusions (Teasdale, 1983). Significantly however, the 
present study found that responsibility, though moderately correlated with depression, 
made a considerable contribution even when depression was controlled. Contrary to 
Salkovskis’ hypothesis neither neuroticism (anxiety) nor depression were necessary 
preconditions for the importance of responsibility. A testing of the proposed causal 
relationships in Salkovskis’ model was not the purpose of the present research. 
Nonetheless future prospective studies are needed to further investigate the role of 
depression, anxiety, and responsibility in obsessions and compulsions.
Very recently Reynolds and Salkovskis (1991) investigated the possibility 
that guilt is the key underlying factor in exaggerated appraisals of responsibility for 
behaviour. However when using the Perceived Guilt Index (Otterbacher & Munz, 1973) 
they found that the PGI does not independently predict either pleasant or unpleasant 
intrusive thoughts. They concluded that over-perception of responsibility, hypothesized to 
play a role in problems with persistent intrusive thoughts, will not necessarily be 
associated with guilt feelings.
Thus the present study has again found that neuroticism is important in 
obsessions and compulsions. Moreover, though one of its traits depression was also 
significant, neuroticism retained its unique dimensional importance when depression was 
controlled. Recent studies of other neuroticism traits, such as anxiety and guilt, have 
proposed these traits are a necessary condition for the importance of responsibility in 
obsessions and compulsions. The evidence so far gathered in support of this hypothesis 
has been weak.
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Introversion.
Introversion was not important in the present nor in Sanavio’s (1988) 
study. This seems mainly attributable to the use of the Padua Inventory as the criterion 
measure. In addition the difference in results may also reflect changes in the composition 
of the extraversion-introversion dimension, as well as differences in the respective 
samples studied.
Criterion Measure.
In contrast then to the present study other previous research reports an 
association between both neuroticism and introversion and obsessive-compulsive 
behaviour. Generally either the Leyton Obsessional Inventory (LOI) (Cooper, 1970) or 
the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Questionnaire (MOCQ) (Hodgson & Rachman, 
1977) was used as the criterion measure in such research. The LOI is a self-report 
measure, but only of certain types of obsessions and compulsions - domestic checking and 
cleaning behaviours. In fact according to Cooper (1970), the scale’s designer, "Emphasis 
on the more alarming and unpleasant types of obsessional symptoms was avoided" (p.51) 
- violent and aggressive symptoms were not included. Kendell and DiScipio (1970), for 
instance, found that introversion and neuroticism were important in the obsessions and 
compulsions of depressed subjects when the LOI was the criterion measure. Thus for a 
depressed sample, introversion was important in domestic cleaning and checking 
obsessions and compulsions.
The MOCQ (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977) seems even more restrictive in 
its measure of obsessive-compulsive behaviour than the LOI. It is a measure of "only 
those obsessional problems associated with observable rituals", that is, compulsions 
(p.393). Kelly (1980), using the MOCL as the criterion measure, reported high 
introversion and neuroticism as measured by the Maudsley Personality Inventory 
(Eysenck, 1959) for his obsessional clients. Thus for an obsessional sample, introversion 
and neuroticism were both important when the criterion measure was loaded on 
compulsive behaviours.
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However using the Eysenck Personality Inventory (1975), Sanchez-Turet 
et al. (1981) found that psychiatrically diagnosed obsessives and depressives were more 
introverted but less neurotic than hysterics, dysthymics, and reactive depressives. It could 
be argued that the psychiatric diagnoses were more strongly weighted towards the more 
easily identified and observable compulsive behaviours. Taken together these studies 
provide evidence of a relationship between neuroticism and introversion on the one hand 
and compulsions on the other. However other studies indicate that the relationship is 
with both compulsions and obsessions where the behaviours are of the domestic cleaning 
and checking kind. The studies that found introversion and neuroticism important in 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour only measured circumscribed aspects of that behaviour.
The finding in the present study (as in Sanavio’s (1988)) that introversion 
was not a significant predictor of obsessions and compulsions was, nevertheless, 
unexpected. Though the previous studies implicating introversion did not use the Padua 
Inventory, it has well established convergent validity with both the MOCQ and the LOI 
(Sternberger & Burns, 1990). Accordingly a similar pattern of relationships with predictor 
variables was anticipated for the Padua Inventory as was found for the MOCL and the 
LOI. This did not occur.
The present study did, however, find a significant correlation (in the 
normal sample) between introversion and "Impaired Control of Mental Activities", one of 
the two obsessional factors of the Padua Inventory. Yet given the apparent loading of the 
LOI and to a greater extent the MOCQ on compulsive behaviour, one might have 
expected both neuroticism and introversion to correlate significantly with the two 
compulsive scales. Instead, introversion only correlated with one of the obsessive scales of 
the Padua Inventory. It therefore seems doubtful that the reason introversion and 
neuroticism were both important in earlier studies was because the criterion measure was 
tapping compulsions.
Close inspection of the 30 item MOCQ reveals that one third tap features 
of obsessions: for example, "I have a very strict conscience", "I don’t worry unduly about 
contamination if I touch an animal". Thus the scale is weighted towards compulsions, but 
measures obsessions as well. In contrast the Padua Inventory is weighted towards 
obsessions; 30 items load onto the obsessional factors, but only 21 items load onto the 
compulsion factors. It appears, then, that there is an imbalance in both the Padua 
Inventory and in other previously used measures. If this is the case, neuroticism is an 
important factor in the development of obsessions and compulsions.
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Introversion, however, only remains important for some measures of compulsions (the 
MOCQ and LOI, but not the PI); and some types of obsessions (domestic (LOI), general 
(MOCQ) and "Impaired Control of Mental Activities" (PI)). Future research needs to 
address this mild bias toward obsessions in the Padua Inventory in order that the role of 
introversion can be more accurately tested.
The Composition of the Extraversion-Introversion Dimension.
Another reason why introversion proved not to be important when the 
Padua Inventory measure was used could be that, during its development, the nature of 
the introversion-extraversion dimension altered. When the earlier studies reported a 
significant role for introversion in obsessions and compulsions, introversion included the 
trait impulsivity-restraint (Zuckermann et al., 1988). Perhaps in those studies decreases in 
impulsivity (or increases in restraint) played an important role in the overall contribution 
of introversion to increases in obsessions and compulsions. More recently when the 
Padua Inventory has been used as the criterion measure, impulsivity has been included as 
a trait of psychoticism rather than introversion and this may account for introversion’s 
reduced association. However, even if restraint-impulsivity - like responsibility - is an 
important trait in obsessions and compulsions the multi-faceted nature of psychoticism 
works against it contributing an overall significant role in obsessions and compulsions.
Samples Studied.
Finally, the differences in the samples previously studied (depressed, 
obsessional, obsessive-compulsive), compared with a normal sample in the present study, 
could further explain differences in the operation of introversion. Future research needs 
to investigate larger clinical obsessive-compulsive groups than the present pilot sample of 
20 used in this study. In future research, it would be useful to explore the contribution to 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour made by the individual components of personality 
dimensions such as introversion-extraversion. This would provide more information 
about the way introversion operates as a total dimension and which traits make the 
crucial contribution to obsessions and compulsions.
Psychoticism.
Contrary to predictions the third Eysenckian dimension, psychoticism, was 
not a significant predictor of obsessive-compulsive behaviour in the present study. 
Perhaps this was because psychoticism, rather than being an integrated personality
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dimension contains various, sometimes apparently unrelated, components. This feature 
may also explain why it has been infrequently studied in relation to obsessions and 
compulsions. Moreover, despite its recent revision (EPQ-R, 1985), psychoticism persists 
as a multi-faceted construct, though many of its other psychometric properties have been 
greatly improved (Eysenck, Eysenck & Barrett, 1985). Nonetheless previous research has 
sometimes found that it is important (Rachman, 1976). There were, furthermore, no 
reported studies of obsessions and compulsions employing the more recently revised "P" 
scale which includes the trait impulsivity-restraint.
In the present study, however, psychoticism had a significant negative 
correlation with one of the compulsive factors of the Padua Inventory - "Becoming 
Contaminated" - but a significant positive correlation with one of the obsessive factors - 
"Urges and Worries of Losing Control over Motor Behaviours". These findings indicate 
that psychoticism has a complex relationship with obsessive-compulsive behaviour. Thus 
increases in P increase one aspect of criterion variance ("Urges and Worries of Losing 
Control over Motor Behaviours"), whereas decreases in P increase a different aspect of 
criterion variance ("Becoming Contaminated"). An overall insignificant result for P as a 
predictor of obsessions and compulsions is not, therefore, surprising.
While these important preliminary findings for psychoticism need to be 
replicated, they do raise important questions for future research. For instance, given the 
complex and multi-faceted nature of P, it would be of interest to explore which traits are 
associated with increases in "Urges and Worries of Losing Control over Motor 
Behaviours?" Increases in the P trait "impulsivity" could be important, as various research 
suggests. Foulds (1965) proposed that "impulsiveness" was another name for the 
consequences of being unable to intend one’s own actions. And, as Forbes (1980) notes, 
this definition of impulsiveness is apt when thinking of the impulsivity of either psychotics 
or delinquents. However impulsivity also captures the lack of control and the "wanting not 
to want" reported by those with disturbing obsessions and compulsions (Rapoport, 1990). 
Accordingly an important focus for future research would be to understand the specific 
role of the psychoticism trait "impulsivity" in obsessions and compulsions.
All things considered psychoticism is not, therefore, important in 
obsessions and compulsions. Nonetheless, the present study has identified more precisely 
than any previous research the complex contribution that psychoticism makes to 
obsessions and compulsions. Moreover it is "responsibility" a more precise concept than 
P, which plays an important role in both obsessions and compulsive behaviour. The 
present study found a significant inverse relationship between psychoticism and
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"responsibility", which can be regarded as measuring a P trait. Thus decreases in 
psychoticism were associated with increases in responsibility.
Responsibility.
Responsibility accounted for an additional 11% of unique variance in 
obsessions and compulsions as measured by the Padua Inventory over and above that 
explained by age, sex, depression, and the three Eysenckian factors. Thus, consistent with 
Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989a, 1989b) findings, increases in responsibility were associated with 
increases in the criterion and with increases in each of its four subscales. Responsibility 
was also associated with increases in neuroticism, depression, and introversion, and with 
decreases in psychoticism. Of the three significant criterion predictors responsibility was 
second in importance to neuroticism, but more important than depression. This was the 
case even when the contribution of depression and age were accounted for. Moreover this 
same pattern of results for responsibility was found for the pilot clinical sample.
Why is Responsibility Linked to the Padua Inventory?
The findings made in this study might suggest that responsibility and the 
Padua Inventory are measuring the same construct. Certainly a superficial inspection of 
items seems to indicate that there is a lot of overlap between what the Padua Inventory 
and the variable responsibility are measuring. There is, however empirical, conceptual, 
and clinical evidence to indicate that responsibility and the PI are distinct and that they 
are measuring different things.
Empirical Evidence that Responsibility and the Padua Inventory are Distinct.
In the present study the correlation between these two scales was .39 
below their mean scale reliability. Thus the two scales were empirically distinct though 
obviously related (r=,50,/?<.01). Moreover responsibility accounted for a significant but 
only moderate 11% of the variance in the Padua Inventory. In addition, Salkovskis 
(1989a) reported that in a study of 243 non-clinical subjects, he found a significant 
correlation between higher scores on "belief ratings of responsibility for harm" and higher 
scores on the Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977). 
Thus responsibility was significantly related with a criterion measure of obsessions and 
compulsions other than the Padua Inventory.
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Clinical Evidence.
Crino has found from his extensive clinical experience in treating OCD 
that some clients state that their obsessions and compulsions are not necessarily linked 
with responsibility. When asked why they think or act as they do they reply, "Because I 
just have to" (R. D. Crino, personal communication, March, 1991). Nonetheless, though 
perhaps not important for all OCDs, responsibility was important for a significant 
number of normals and clinicals in the present study. If the Padua Inventory and 
responsibility were measuring the same construct, all clinical OCDs, rather than the 
majority, should have had high Padua Inventory as well as high responsibility scores. This 
was not the case.
Conceptual Evidence.
Sanavio (1988) has called the four factors of the Padua Inventory 
"Impaired Control over Mental Activities", "Urges and Worries of Loss of Control over 
Motor Behaviour", "Becoming Contaminated", and "Checking Behaviours". In the present 
study the three responsibility factors were named "Control", "Concern to act to Prevent 
Harm", and "the Belief that Thoughts Lead to Actions". On inspection the first two 
mentioned Padua Inventory factors (the obsessive factors) do share with the first 
"responsibility" factor an emphasis on "control".
However the second and third factors of responsibility are explicit about 
the why, rather than the what (happens) that is described in the two Padua Inventory 
compulsive factors. This was no accident. The items of the responsibility scale were 
developed with the explicit intention of testing Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989a, 1989b) 
theoretical formulation about why normals and clinicals experience obsessions and 
compulsions so differently. He theorized it was because of differences in beliefs about 
responsibility for behaviour. In contrast (with the exception of 9 items) the Padua 
Inventory items typically describe behaviour and not why the behaviour occurs. The 
Responsibility Scale asks the respondent to indicate to what extent "why" statements 
about obsessions and compulsions apply to them. Finally, inspection of the items from the 
two scales suggests some overlap, but predominantly distinctness.
Nonetheless it could be argued that because the Responsibility Scale 
attempts to understand the nature of the conscious appraisals made in relation to 
obsessions and compulsions, it necessarily loads onto thoughts or obsessions. The purpose 
for which the scale was developed makes this feature unavoidable. However, what the
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results from the present study indicate are that thoughts of a particular kind - exaggerated 
assumptions about responsibility for behaviour - are what are important in obsessions and 
compulsions.
However Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989a, 1989b) conceptualization of
responsibility would benefit from refinement, as would the scale developed in the present 
study. Both could be improved by exploring the relationship between responsibility and 
several measures of obsessions and compulsions. Unfortunately practicalities intervened 
which made this impossible in the present study. Also the Padua Inventory is currently a 
mix of items pertaining to what behaviours the respondent finds disturbing (34 items) and 
those which also include a specific reason for why the respondent is disturbed by the 
particular behaviour (9 items). Its utility as a criterion measure would be improved by 
excluding those items that assume an explanatory status. Such a role is best left to 
predictor variables.
It could also be argued that the Responsibility Scale developed for the 
present study is a cognitive appraisal scale. Therefore reference to it as a trait is 
inappropriate. Such a criticism presupposes, however, an unnecessarily narrow 
conception of what a trait refers to. H. J. Eysenck (1976) described traits as invariant 
factors in human behaviour such as abilities, traits, and attitudes which give rise to 
individual differences. Also, according to Clark and Hemsley (1985), certain beliefs or 
schemata are considered fundamental aspects of personality structure by both Beck 
(1976) and Ellis (1977). To treat a cognitive appraisal scale as a trait, seems consistent 
with the conceptualizations of at least these three prominent researchers. Thus there is 
empirical, clinical, and conceptual evidence that responsibility is not measuring the same 
construct as the Padua Inventory.
The Theoretical Basis for the Importance of Responsibility.
The responsibility results are entirely consistent with Salkovskis’ (1985, 
1989a, 1989b) clinical and research findings that those individuals who hold exaggerated 
beliefs about responsibility for harm to themselves or others, are more vulnerable to the 
development of obsessive-compulsive behaviours. Such individuals, like the majority, have 
obsessions or intrusive thoughts. What sets them apart is their appraisal of such thoughts. 
These appraisals are characterized by exaggerated responsibility for the thoughts which 
takes the form of a concern to act to prevent harm, the belief that thoughts lead to action, 
and a general sense of lack of control over the thoughts and their consequences. Perhaps 
such exaggerated appraisals of responsibility are more likely in those with high levels of
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neuroticism (emotional instability) and depression. Perhaps, also, such appraisals further 
increase neuroticism, depression, and responsibility. As stated above, however, causality 
and direction cannot be inferred from the present correlational data. Nonetheless the 
importance of neuroticism, responsibility, and depression in obsessions and compulsions 
has been established for the present samples.
Further, the ten-item scale developed in the present study to measure 
responsibility was designed specifically to tap Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989a, 1989b) five 
dysfunctional assumptions. This scale possessed adequate internal consistency. Construct 
validity was also established to the extent that the scale closely mirrored Salkovskis’ 
(1985, 1989a, 1989b) conceptualizations of the responsibility construct. However future 
refinements need to include the establishment of test-retest reliability and the addition of 
negatively worded items. Those devised for the present study were deleted as they had 
low inter-item correlations. Also, when it becomes available, an Australian replication of 
the Intrusive Thoughts Questionnaire (Salkovskis & Dent; 1986, 1989) upon which 
Salkovskis has based his empirical support for the responsibility concept, would further 
add to an understanding of how responsibility works in obsessions and compulsions.
THE CONTROL VARIABLES - DEPRESSION, AGE, AND SEX.
Depression.
Depression was included as a control variable in the present study so that 
the effects of the variables of interest - the Eysenckian dimensions and responsibility - 
could be studied. Given the substantial though inconclusive evidence of a relationship 
between depression and obsessions and compulsions, it was important to account for any 
contribution it might make. Though depression had shared variance with neuroticism, 
neuroticism emerged as the most important predictor of obsessions and compulsions, 
even when the effects of depression were accounted for. Furthermore, though, depression 
was significantly correlated with responsibility, responsibility emerged as the second most 
important predictor of the criterion when the effects of depression were accounted for. 
When all the variables had been entered, depression was the third of the significant 
criterion predictors. Depression showed the same pattern of correlations in the clinical 
sample.
However as with most previous studies of depression and obsessions and 
compulsions, a directional causal relationship cannot be imputed. Increases in depression 
may lead to increases in obsessive-compulsive behaviour, or increases in obsessive-
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compulsive behaviour may produce increases in depression. Demonstration of directional 
causal relationships would require a longitudinal design.
Age and Sex.
The effects of age and sex were controlled in the present study. This was 
on the basis of Sanavio’s (1988) finding for his Italian sample that both variables were 
significant. In the present study age was correlated with the criterion, and obsessions and 
compulsions were more prevalent in younger subjects, though not to a significant extent. 
Sex was not correlated with the criterion, and the Age X Sex interaction was not 
significant. However because sex was associated with psychoticism and responsibility its 
effects were controlled for.
Thus for the normal sample the contribution of age, sex, and depression 
were accounted for, but depression was the most important of these variables.
LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY.
The three major limitations of the present study were the correlational 
status of the data, the small size of the pilot clinical sample, and the incomplete 
establishment of the psychometric properties of the newly developed Responsibility Scale. 
Future longitudinal studies of larger clinical samples are needed to replicate the present 
findings.
A further potential limitation is the nature of the convenience normal 
sample chosen. However Edwards and Dickerson (1987) found a similar distribution of 
characteristics of negative intrusions, frequency, form, and content for their University 
student sample to those reported elsewhere on normal populations (Rachman & DeSilva, 
1978; Parkinson & Rachman, 1981; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984). Nonetheless the 
generalizability of the present results would be strengthened by future studies of large 
normal and clinical samples.
Finally, though a significant 50% (AdjR? = 47%) of variance in obsessions 
and compulsions was explained, a sizeable 50% remains unexplained. Future research 
needs to investigate the importance of genetic and biological factors and of traits other 
than responsibility, such as impulsivity-restraint and anxiety. This would permit a 
systematic theoretical development based on the important personality factors and
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refined by taking into consideration the contribution of relevant traits. Moreover any 
important genetic and biological factors would need to be isolated.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESENT FINDINGS.
The findings for this normal sample, reflected in the small clinical sample, 
have several implications. These pertain specifically to the assessment and treatment of 
clinical obsessions and compulsions. First, despite its slight bias towards obsessions, the 
Padua Inventory could play a useful part in the process of clinical assessment of 
obsessions and compulsions. Not only does it elicit information about the nature of the 
obsessions and compulsions experienced, but also the associated degree of discomfort. In 
addition, being a self-report measure, it is time-efficient. Future studies however, need 
first to demonstrate its utility for such a specific purpose.
Secondly, the present study suggests that the only Eysenckian dimension 
associated with increases in obsessions and compulsions is neuroticism. Introversion was 
not a factor. This finding needs replication using a revised Padua Inventory - one which 
includes a more equitable balance of obsessive and compulsive items. If other support is 
found for the present finding for introversion, this has potentially important treatment 
implications. The large body of research into introversion, and its effects on learning and 
habituation (getting used to stimuli such as obsessions), may need to be redirected 
towards neuroticism. More needs to be known about what role neuroticism plays in an 
individual’s appraisal of obsessions and their subsequent ability to habituate to them. 
Such research may necessitate a considerable revamping of the current cognitive and 
behavioural (exposure and response prevention) treatments for obsessions and 
compulsions.
Thirdly, the present study also demonstrates that specific traits such as 
responsibility, and possibly traits such as impulsivity or anxiety, may be important. 
Initially the treatment application of this finding for responsibility seems obvious.
Exposure and response prevention have established success in treating 
75% of cases of obsessions and compulsions (Crino, 1990). Also there are a growing 
number of OCD treatment studies investigating the efficacy of cognitive techniques (e.g., 
Emmelkamp et al., 1988; Salkovskis & Warwick, 1988; Salkovskis & Westbrook 1987). 
However these researchers concluded that the relative contribution of explicit cognitive 
techniques have not yet been established. Nonetheless whether the treatment of choice is
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exposure and response prevention or cognitive restructuring, the use of the Responsibility 
Scale as part of the assessment of obsessions and compulsions would more precisely 
identify the focus of treatment; the particular dysfunctional beliefs. Such information 
would be of particular value in cognitive restructuring where the exaggerated beliefs need 
to be closely identified, challenged, and altered. Should additional traits be identified as 
important, this knowledge would contribute further to current treatment strategies for 
OCD.
However more precise identification of the dysfunctional beliefs, does not 
necessarily guide the clinician to more effective treatment strategies. Such a step also 
requires testable theories of thought and behaviour change. The future awaits such 
developments.
CONCLUSIONS.
The present study demonstrates that increases in neuroticism, 
responsibility, and depression are associated with increased severity of discomfort from 
obsessions and compulsions. Such findings can be generalized to the normal population 
though their clinical application awaits longitudinal studies of large clinical samples. 
Nonetheless support was found for the assumption that normals and clinicals only differ 
quantitatively in their experience of obsessions and compulsions. These differences are, 
moreover, attributable in part to the same variables displaying the same pattern of 
correlations. Accordingly the usefulness of personality measures of individual differences 
as predictors of obsessions and compulsions has been confirmed. This study also 
demonstrated the utility of establishing the important Eysenckian dimensions prior to 
adding traits implicated by research. Future research is required that builds on these 
findings by investigating the potential additional contribution of such traits as impulsivity, 
anxiety, and guilt.
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Appendix A
PERSONALITY, THOUGHTS AND BEHAVIOURS QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire is part of a clinical masters research project on the nature of 
the relationship between personality and thoughts and behaviours.
The questionnaire asks for information about your thoughts, feelings and 
behaviours and will be treated as strictly confidential. It is comprised of five 
questionnaires covering twelve pages and should take about one hour to 
complete. Please answer all questions as accurately and completely as you can.
AGE: __________  (Please write in years)
GENDER: Male Female (Circle one)
DATE:
Many thanks
PLEASE TURN THE PAGE.
IPART ONE
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer each question by putting a circle around the 'YES" or the "NO" following 
the question. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick questions. Work quickly 
and do not think too long about the exact meaning of the questions.
1. Do you have many different hobbies?....................................................................... YES NO
2. Does your mood often go up and down?...................................................................  YES NO
3. Are you a talkative person?.......................................................................................  YES NO
4. Do you ever feel "just miserable" for no reason?.......................................................  YES NO
5. Are you rather lively?.................................................................................................  YES NO
5. Do you often worry about things you should not have done or said?.........................  YES NO
7 . Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself at a lively party?.......................... YES NO
3. Are you an irritable person?.......................................................................................  YES NO
?.  Do you enjoy meeting new people?............................................................................. YES NO
10. Are your feelings easily hurt?...................................................................................  YES NO
11. Do you tend to keep in the background on social occasions?......................................  YES NO
12. Do you often feel "fed-up"?........................................................................................  YES NO
13. Do you like going out a lot?......................................................................................  YES NO
14. Are you often troubled about feelings of guilt?.........................................................  YES NO
15. Do you prefer reading to meeting people?................................................................ YES NO
16. Would you call yourself a nervous person?..............................................................  YES NO
17. Do you have many friends?.......................................................................................  YES NO
18. Are you a worrier?......................................................................................................  YES NO
19. Would you call yourself happy-go-lucky?................................................................  YES NO
-0. Do you worry about awful things that might happen?.............................................. YES NO
H. Do you usually take the initiative in making new friends?....................................... YES NO
12. Would you call yourself tense or "highly strung"?..................................................... YES NO
>3. Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people?............................................  YES NO
14. Can you easily get some life into a rather dull party?.............................................  YES NO
15. Do you worry about your health?.............................................................................  YES NO
16. Do you like telling jokes and funny stories to your friends?.....................................  YES NO
17. Do you like mixing with people?..............................................................................  YES NO
18. Do you suffer from sleeplessness?.............................................................................. YES NO
19. Do you nearly always have a "ready answer" when people talk to you?..................  YES NO
>0. Have you often felt listless and tired for no reason?.................................................  YES NO
■1. Do you like doing things in which you have to act quickly?...................................... YES NO
-2. Do you often feel life is very dull?............................................................................  YES NO
>3. Do you often take on more activities than you have time for?.................................... YES NO
234. Do you worry a lot about your looks?............................................................................ YES NO
35. Have you ever wished that you were dead?...............................................................  YES NO
36. Can you get a party going?............................................................................................. YES NO
37. Do you worry too long after an embarrassing experience?........................................... YES NO
38. Do you suffer from "nerves"?..........................................................................................  YES NO
39. Do you often feel lonely?.................................................................................................  YES NO
40. Are you easily hurt when people find fault with you or the work you do?..................  YES NO
41. Do you like plenty of bustle and excitement around you?............................................  YES NO
42. Are you sometimes bubbling over with energy and sometimes very sluggish?..............  YES NO
43. Do other people think of you as being very lively?....................................................  YES NO
44. Are you touchy about some things?............................................................................... YES NO
PLEASE CHECK THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS
3PART TWO
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer each question by putting a circle around the "YES" or the "NO" following 
the question. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick questions. Work quickly 
and do not think too long about the exact meaning of the questions
1. Do you stop to think things over before doing anything?..............................................  YES NO
l .  Do you take much notice of what people think?.......................................................... YES NO
5. Would being in debt worry you?.................................................................................... YES NO
k Do you give money to charities?.................................................................................... YES NO
5. Would it upset you a lot to see a child or animal suffer?.............................................. YES NO
j. Do you dislike people who do not know how to behave themselves?............................  YES NO
7• Should people always respect the law?..........................................................................  YES NO
k Are good manners very important?.................................................................................  YES NO
). Would you take drugs that may have strange or dangerous effects?...............................  YES NO
10. Do you prefer to go your own way rather than act by the rules?..................................  YES NO
1. Do you enjoy hurting people you love?...........................................................................  YES NO
2. Do you have enemies who want to harm you?..............................................................  YES NO
3. Do you enjoy practical jokes? ........................................................................................  YES NO
4. Do good manners and cleanliness matter much to you?.................................................  YES NO
i5. Have you often gone against your parents wishes?.......................................................  YES NO
.6. Do you think marriage is old-fashioned and should be done away with?.....................  YES NO
7. Are you more easy going about right and wrong than most people?..............................  YES NO
8. Do you enjoy cooperating with others?.........................................................................  YES NO
9. Do most things taste the same to you?.............................................................................. YES NO
:0. Does it worry you if you know there are mistakes in your work?..................................  YES NO
1. Do you arrive at appointments in plenty of time?........................................................  YES NO
2. Is (or was) your mother a good woman?.......................................................................  YES NO
3. Are there several people who keep trying to avoid you?........................................... YES NO
4. Do you think people spend too much time safeguarding their future with savings and
insurances?...........................................................................................................................  YES NO
p .  Do you try not to be rude to people?.............................................................................  YES NO
6- Do you generally "look before you leap"?.....................................................................  YES NO
7. Can you on the whole trust people to tell the truth?..................................................  YES NO
8. Is it better to follow society's rules than go your own way?........................................  YES NO
429. Would you like other people to be afraid of you?...........................................................  YES NO
30. Do people tell you a lot of lies?.........................................................................................  YES NO
31. Do you believe one has special duties to ones family?.................................................... YES NO
32 Would you feel very sorry for an animal caught in a trap?...............................................  YES NO
PLEASE CHECK THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS
PART THREE 
FI:
5
F3:
F2:
F4:
SCORE
INSTRUCTIONS: The following statements refer to thoughts and behaviours which may occur to everyone 
in everyday life. For each statement, choose the reply which best seems to fit you and 
the degree of disturbance which such thoughts or behaviours may create. Rate your 
replies as follows:
0 1 2 3 4
L 1 L 1 J
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
1. I feel my hands are dirty when I touch money. ( ......... )
2. I think even slight contact with bodily secretions (perspiration, saliva, urine etc)
may contaminate my clothes or somehow harm me...........................................................  (.......... )
3. I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by strangers or
by certain people........................................................................................................................  (.......... )
4. I find it difficult to touch garbage or dirty things...............................................................  (.......... )
5. I avoid using public toilets because I am afraid of disease and contamination.................. (.......... )
3. I avoid using public telephones because I am afraid of contagion and disease...................  (.......... )
7. I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary......................................................  (.......... )
l .  I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I think I may be dirty or
"contaminated".................................................................................................................................. (.......... )
). If I touch something I think is "contaminated" I immediately have to wash
or clean m yself...............................................................................................................................  (.......... )
0. If an animal touched me I feel dirty and immediately have to wash myself or
change my clothing........................................................................................................................ (.......... )
1. When doubts and worries come to my mind I cannot rest until I have talked them over
with a reassuring person............................................................................................................  (.......... )
2. When I talk I tend to repeat the same things and the same sentences several times.......... (..........)
3. I tend to ask people to repeat the same things to me several times consecutively,
even though I did understand what they said the first time.............................................  (.......... )
4. I feel obliged to follow a particular order in dressing, undressing and washing myself. ... (......... )
5. Before going to sleep I have to do certain things in a certain order.................................... (.......... )
0 1 2 3 4
L 1 i i -1
n o t  a t  all a l i t t l e q u i t e  a lot a lo t v e r y  m u c h
16.
17.
18.
19.
20 . 
21. 
22 .
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
Before going to bed I have to hang up or fold my clothes in a special way......................  (
I feel I have to repeat certain numbers for no reason......................................................  (
I have to do things several times before I think they are properly done......................... (
I tend to keep on checking things more often than necessary..........................................  (
I check and recheck gas and water taps and light switches after turning them off........... (
I return home to check doors, windows, drawers etc. to make sure they are properly shut. ( 
I keep on checking forms, documents, cheques in detail to make sure I have filled them
in correctly............................................................................................................................  (
I keep on going back to see that matches, cigarettes etc. are properly extinguished.......... (
When I handle money I count and recount it several times..............................................  (
I check letters carefully many times before posting them................................................  (
I find it difficult to make decisions, even about unimportant matters..............................  (
Sometimes I am not sure I have done things which in fact I know I have done.................  (.
I have the impression that I will never be able to explain things clearly, especially 
when talking about important matters which involve me...............................................  (.
After doing something carefuly, I still have the impression I have either done it badly 
or not finished it.................................................................................................................. (
I am sometimes late because I keep on doing certain things more often than necessary....... (
I invent doubts and problems about most of the things I do.............................................. (
When I start thinking of certain things, I become obsessed with them............................  (
Unpleasant thoughts come into my mind against my will and I cannot get rid of them...... (
Obscene or dirty words come into my mind and I cannot get rid of them...........................  (
My brain constantly goes its own way and I find it difficult to attend to what is 
happening around me........................................................................................................  (
I imagine catastrophic consequences as a result of absent-mindedness or minor errors 
which I make....................................................  (
I think or worry at length about having hurt someone without knowing it......................  (
When I hear about a disaster I think it is somehow my fault.......................................... (.
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
. )
. )
.)
.)
)
)
)
)
)
)
39. I sometimes worry at length for no reason that I have hurt myself or have some disease. ( )
0 4
40 .
41 .
42 .
43 .
44 .
45 .
46 .
47 .
48 .
49 .
50 .
51 .
52 .
53 .
54 .
55 .
56 .
57 .
58 .
59 .
60 .
1 2 3
I___________________i -------------------------- J__________________ 1 __________________1
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
I sometimes start counting objects for no reason.................................................................  (
I feel I have to remember completely unimportant numbers.............................................. (
When I read I have the impression I have missed something important and
must go back and reread the passage at least two or three times......................................  (
I worry about remembering completely unimportant things and make an effort
not to forget them..................................................................................................................... (
When a thought or doubt comes into my mind I have to examine it from
all points of view and cannot stop until I have done so..................................................... (
In certain situations I am afraid of losing my self-control and doing embarrassing things. (
When I look down from a bridge or a very high window I feel an impulse to
throw myself into space..........................................................................................................  (
When I see a train approaching I sometimes think I could throw myself under its wheels. (
At certain moments I am tempted to tear off my clothes in public.....................................  (
While driving I sometimes feel an impulse to drive the car into someone or something. .. (
Seeing weapons excites me and makes me think violent thoughts....................................  (
I get upset and worried at the sight of knives, daggers, and other pointed objects............  (
I sometimes feel something inside me which makes me do things which are really 
senseless and which I do not want to do..............................................................................  (
I sometimes feel the need to break or damage things for no reason..................................... (
I sometimes have an impulse to steal other people's belongings even if they are
of no use to me.......................................................................................................................... (
I am sometimes almost irresistably tempted to steal something from the supermarket. ... (.
I sometimes have an impulse to hurt defenseless children or animals...............................  (.
I feel I have to make special gestures or walk in a certain way......................................... (.
In certain situations I feel an impulse to eat too much, even if I am then ill.....................  (.
When I hear about a suicide or a crime I am upset for a long time and find it
difficult to stop thinking about it........................................................................................ (.
I invent useless worries about germs and disease................................................................  (.
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
. )
)
)
)
PLEASE CHECK THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS
PART FOUR
INSTRUCTIONS: At times we ALL have intrusive thoughts and engage to some extent in repetitive 
behaviours.
An intrusive thought is one which seems to be INVOLUNTARY and which you have 
REPEATEDLY. The content of intrusive thoughts may be pleasant (eg. entertaining 
sexual fantasies), or unpleasant (eg. imagining failure at some task, or doing harm to 
others).
A repetative behaviour is an action you perform even though you suspect it is 
unnecessary, (eg. checking that you have switched off the stove numerous times before 
going out).
For each of the items below, indicate to what extent the statement applies to you. 
Please choose ONE response only.
1. When I have an intrusive thought about doing something (eg. failing at a task), I consider that 
having the thought means that I will do it.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
2. When I have a repetitive intrusive thought, I feel responsible for having that thought.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
3. If 1 have an intrusive thought about doing harm to myself or to others, (eg. crashing my car into a
tree), I feel responsible for stopping that harm.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
4. When I have an intrusive thought (eg. a sexual fantasy), I consider that having the thought does
NOT mean that I will act it out.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
5. When I have intrusive thoughts about causing harm to myself or to others, I feel responsible for 
having failed to control such thoughts.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
6. If I have an intrusive thought about having done something harmful (eg. by leaving on the stove), 
have to check it out to clear myself of any blame.
0
not at all
1
a little
2
quite a lot
3
a lot
4
very much
97.
8 .
9.
12 .
If I have a repetitive intrusive thought (eg. of being unprepared for something), I do NOT feel 
responsible for having the thought
not at all
1
a little quite a lot
3
a lot very much
I make numerous checks that I have done things properly (eg. turning off the gas), to prevent harm 
coming to myself or to others.
0 1 2 
not at all a little quite a lot
It is not my fault if I have repetitive intrusive thoughts.
not at all a little quite a lot
3
a lot
3
a lot
very much
very much
10. I find it hard to control thoughts like: "I may have harmed others because of inaction on my part".
not at all
1
a little quite a lot
3
a lot very much
If I have an intrusive thought of doing harm to myself or to others, I would feel somehow 
responsible if harm were to come to them or to me.
not at all
1
a little quite a lot
3
a lot very much
I keep washing things when I know they are clean, so I am not responsible for contaminating myself 
or others.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
13. When I have repetitive intrusive thoughts, I feel responsible for NOT being able to control them.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
14. If I have the thought that I might have harmed someone, I need to fix things up so I am completely 
free of responsibility.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
PLEASE CHECK YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS
1 0 .
PART FIVE
INSTRUCTIONS: On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each goup of statements
carefully. Then pick out the one statement in each group which best describes the way
vou have been feeling the PAST WEEK . INCLUDING TODAY. Circle the number 
beside the statement you picked. If several statements in the group seem to apply 
equallv well, circle each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each group before 
making vour choice.
1. 0 
1 
2 
3
I do not feel sad.
I feel sad.
I am sad all the time and I can’t stand it.
I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it.
2. 0 
1 
2 
3
I am not particularly discouraged about the future.
I feel discouraged about the future.
I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve.
3. 0
1 
2 
3
I do not feel like a failure.
I feel I have failed more than the average person.
As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures. 
I feel I am a complete failure as a person.
4. 0
1 
2 
3
I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to.
I don't enjoy things the way I used to.
I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
I am dissatisfied or bored with everything.
5. 0
1 
2 
3
I don't feel particularly guilty.
I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
1 feel quite guilty most of the time.
I feel guilty all of the time.
6. 0 
1
2.
3.
I don’t feel I am being punished 
I feel I may be punished.
I expect to be punished.
I feel I am being punished.
7. 0
1 
2 
3
I don't feel disappointed in myself. 
I am disappointed in myself.
I am disgusted with myself.
I hate myself.
8. 0 
1 
2 
3
I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else.
I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
I blame myself all the time for my faults.
I blame myself for everything bad that happens.
9. 0
1 
2 
3
I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
I would like to kill myself.
I would kill myself if I had the chance.
11
10. 0 
1 
2 
3
I don't cry anymore than usual.
I cry more now than I used to.
I cry all the time now.
I used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry even though I want to.
11. 0 
1 
2 
3
I am no more irritated now than I ever am.
I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to.
I feel irritated all the time now.
I don’t get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me.
12. 0 
1
2.
3
I have not lost interest in other people.
I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
I have lost most of my interest in other people.
I have lost all of my interest in other people.
13. 0
1 
2 
3
I make decisions about as well as I ever could.
I put off making decisions more than I used to.
I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before. 
I can’t make decisions at all anymore.
14. 0
1 
2 
3
I don’t feel I look any worse than I used to.
I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive.
I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look unattractive. 
I believe that I look ugly.
15. 0
1 
2 
3
I can work about as well as before.
It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something. 
I have to push myself very hard to do anything.
I can’t do any work at all.
16. 0 
1 
2 
3
I can sleep as well as usual.
I don’t sleep as well as I used to.
I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep. 
I wake up several hours earlier than I used to an cannot get back to sleep.
17. 0
1 
2 
3.
I don’t get more tired than usual.
I get tired more easily than I used to.
I get tired from doing almost anything. 
I am too tired to do anything.
18. 0 
1 
2 
3
My appetite is no worse than usual.
My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
My appetite is much worse now.
I have no appetite at all anymore.
19. 0
1 
2 
3
I haven't lost much weight, if any lately. 
I have lost more than 5 pounds.
I have lost more than 10 pounds.
I have lost more than 15 pounds.
I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less YES NO
12.
20. 0
1
I am no more worried about my health than usual.
I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; or upset stomach; or
2
3
constipation.
I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to think of much else.
I am so worried about my physical problems, that I cannot think about anything else.
21. 0 
1 
2 
3
I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
I am much less interested in sex now.
I have lost interest in sex completely.
PLEASE CHECK THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS ON ALL TEN PAGES
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE
APPENDIX B
RESPONSIBILITY QUESTIONNAIRE
INSTRUCTIONS: At times we ALL have intrusive thoughts and engage to some extent in 
repetitive behaviours.
An intrusive thought is one which seems to be INVOLUNTARY and which you 
have REPEATEDLY. The content of intrusive thoughts may be pleasant (eg. 
entertaining sexual fantasies), or unpleasant (eg. imagining failure at some 
task, or doing harm to others).
A repetative behaviour is an action you perform even though you suspect it is 
unnecessary, (eg. checking that you have switched off the stove numerous times 
before going out).
For each of the following items, indicate to what extent the statement applies 
to you. Please choose ONE response only.
When I have an intrusive thought about doing something (eg. failing at a task), I consider that 
having the thought means that I will do it.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
When I have a repetitive intrusive thought, I feel responsible for having that thought.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
If I have an intrusive thought about doing harm to myself or to others, (eg. crashing my car into a 
tree), I feel responsible for stopping that harm.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
When I have intrusive thoughts about causing harm to myself or to others, I feel responsible for 
having failed to control such thoughts.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
If I have an intrusive thought about having done something harmful (eg. by leaving on the stove), I 
have to check it out to clear myself of any blame.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
I make numerous checks that I have done things properly (eg. turning off the gas), to prevent harm 
coming to myself or to others.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
I find it hard to control thoughts like: "I may have harmed others because of inaction on my part".
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
If I have an intrusive thought of doing harm to myself or to others, I would feel somehow 
responsible if harm  were to come to them or to me.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
When I have repetitive intrusive thoughts, I feel responsible for NOT being able to control them.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
If I have the thought that I might have harm ed someone, I need to fix things up so I am completely 
free of responsibility.
0 1 2  3 4
not at all a little quite a lot a lot very much
APPENDIX C
Means and Standard Deviations of the 10 Responsibility Items retained (N  = 152) 
(Normals)
ITEM MEAN SD
Resp 1 .91 .76
Resp 2 1.22 .98
Resp 3 2.01 1.54
Resp 4 1.16 1.28
Resp 5 1.53 1.14
Resp 6 .95 1.04
Resp 7 .68 .90
Resp 8 1.09 1.09
Resp 9 .95 1.12
Resp 10 1.28 1.26
Scale 11.78 7.24
STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .84 (10 items)
